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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent scientific research indicates that synthetic chemicals may disrupt the human endocrine system, possibly
causing decreased fertility, malformed reproductive organs,
increased levels of cancer in reproductive organs, impaired
fetal development, and neurological, thyroid, and immune
disorders. 1 These endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs),
which mimic, block, or otherwise interfere with normal
hormonal signals, are found in pesticides, plastics, detergents, industrial materials, drinking water, and other substances. 2 Over fifty different chemicals may have endocrine
disrupting effects, 3 and these chemicals permeate our environment. We may be exposed to them through the prod-:ucts we use, the food we eat, the water we drink, and the
air we breath.
Inquily into endocrine disruption is relatively re<;:ent, and
scientists still do not have a full understanding of the
mechanisms through which EDCs may harm human
health. Some of the suspected links between EDCs and
health and reproductive disorders may turn out to be false,
but if the central hypothesis is confirmed that synthetic
chemicals are disrupting hormonal pathways, EDCs could
be among the most persistent, widespread, and damaging
toxins to which humans have been exposed. Reflecting on
the potential danger and current scientific uncertainties,
the authors of Our Stolen Future, 4 a 1996 book on endocrine
1. See Robert J. Kavlock et al., Research Needs for the Risk Assessment of
Health and Environmental Effects ofEndocrtne Disruptors: A Report of the U.S. EPAsponsored Workshop, 104 ENVIL. HEAL1H PERSPEC'IlVES. Supplement 4, 715, 720
(1996).

2. See Jonna Topparl et al., Male Reproductive Health and Environmental Xenoestrogens, 104 ENVIL. HEAL1H PERSPEC'IlVES, Supplement 4, 741. 758 (1996).
3. See 'niEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR SroLEN FtrruRE: ARE WE 'I'HREAmNING OUR
FEimUIY. INreWGENCE AND SURVIVAL?- A SCIENilFIC DETEC11VE SroRY 81 (1996).

For a list of suspected endocrine dlsruptors. see Known Enodcrine Disruptors
Oast modified May 6, 1996) <:www.vcu.edu/cesweb/ed/disruptors.html>. Some of
the suspected endocrine disruptors, such as DDT and PCBs, are no longer produced in the United States, but they persist in the environment and are believed
to be significant contributors to EDC risks. See Part III, infra.
4. OUR SroLEN Fl.JruRE was aimed at a lay audience and contained a foreword by
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disruption, warn that "humans do appear to be gambling
with their ability to reproduce over the long term.... "5
Although there is a clear need for further research into
EDCs, the legal and regulatory communities should begin
to consider the types of responses that may be appropriate
if the scientific evidence grows stronger. Very little legal literature has been produced on EDCs, however, and most
academic and governmental discussion of EDCs has focused on understanding their health risks and on identifying new avenues for research. As Mary O'Brian, a toxics
and risk assessment specialist, notes, those "trained in
law ... must supply ideas for litigation and legislation that
are equal to the problem. "6
This article describes and assesses potential legal responses to EDCs, focusing on regulation and litigation, and
concludes that existing legal tools will probably be inadequate to respond to EDC risks. The main obstacle to legal
action is scientific uncertainty, which has frequently posed
challenges for our legal system in contexts such as environmental regulation and toxic tort litigation. Scientific
uncertainty is likely to plague the risk assessment process
for EDCs, delaying potentially effective regulations even
though existing statutes provide sufficient authority to
regulate EDCs. 7 In the litigation context, scientific uncertainty will make it difficult to connect a given EDC to a
given harm. 8 The usual problems with bringing a toxic tort
suit, such as long latency periods, proof of causation, and
identification of defendants, would be magnified many-fold.
Although scientific understanding of EDCs is likely to increase over the next few years, remaining uncertainties can
probably be used as a shield to block regulatory efforts and
Vice President Al Gore, who compared the book to Rachel Carson's Silent Spring.
Id. at vii. For examples of media reports about the book and endocrine disruption
generally, see Michael Lemonick, What's Wrong with Our Spemf? TIME, March 18,
1996, at 78; Sharon Begley, 1lle Great Impostors, NEWSWEEK. March 18, 1996, at
48; John Carey, A Scary Wamtng- or Scare Story? BUSINESS WEEK, April 8, 1996,
at 18; Rick Weiss & Gary Lee, PoUution's Effect on Hwnan Homwnes: When Fear
Exceeds Evidence, WASH. Posr, March 31, 1996, atA14.
5. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 234.
6. Mary O'Brian, Our Current Taxies Use Ftamework. Our Stolen Future, and Our
Options, 11 J. ENvn.. L. & Lrr. 331, 332 (1996).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
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claims by tort litigants. In short, we may be facing a signiflcant new toxic risk with few legal tools available to protect public health.
This article acknowledges the preliminary nature of scientific investigation of EDCs. It undertakes an examination
of potential legal responses not to urge immediate legal action, but to explore options so that the scientific and legal
communities can begin to share ideas as research progresses. Because EDCs have unusual toxicological characteristics, current risk assessment techniques and regulatory tools may be inadequate.
Fundamentally new
approaches may need to be developed if the United States is
to respond effectively to EDC risks. In the near term, a
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of existing
legal and regulatory options can help to identify more effective approaches to EDCs.
Part II of this article provides an overview of EDCs and
the current state of scientific knowledge regarding their
health effects. The main categories and uses of EDCs are
outlined in Part III. Part IV explores the adequacy of current toxic chemical statutes and regulations for addressing
EDC risks, and Part V examines the prospects for litigation
over EDCs. Finally, Part VI briefly outlines some promising
new approaches to EDCs that could be warranted if the scientific case against EDCs contlriues to strengthen.
II.

OVERVIEW OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION

A. The Endocrine System

The endocrine system, along with the nervous system and
the immune system, is one of the three main integrating
and regulatory mechanisms in the human body. 9 The endocrine system is composed of hormone-secreting glands
such as the pituitary, hypothalamus, testicles, or ovaries;
over 50 different chemical hormones that travel through the
bloodstream, such as estrogen or testosterone; and hor9. See RisK AssESSMENT FORUM TEcHNICAL PANEL. UNITED STATES ENviRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/630/R-96/012, SPECIAL REPORT ON ENDOCRINE
DISRUPnON: AN EFFECI'S AssESSMENT AND ANALYSIS 2 (1997) [hereinafter EPA RISK
AssESSMENT FORUM). <WWW.epa.gov/ORD/WebPubs/endocrine/endocrine.pdf>.
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mone receptors located throughout the body. 10 Hormones
regulate many key bodily functions, including blood sugar,
ovulation, pregnancy, and development. 11 They act by
binding with protein receptors in locations such as the
brain, glands, or reproductive organs to change cell activity,
including the activation of strands of DNA to express
genes. 12 Hormones can act in extremely low doses, as low
as parts-per-trillion concentrations in the blood stream. 13
Endocrine disrupting chemicals can interfere with normal
hormonal functioning in several ways. They can disrupt
the synthesis, storage, release, transport, and clearance of
hormones, and they can disturb receptor recognition, receptor binding, or post-receptor responses within cells. 14
Some EDCs are hormone mimickers that bind to protein receptors in place of the natural hormone. Some enhance (an
agonistic effect) or inhibit (an antagonistic effect) the action
of hormones. 15 Other EDCs may directly affect the overall
production of certain hormones in the body. 16 Much of the
scientific research into EDCs has focused on estrogenic
compounds: chemicals that mimic estrogen. 17
B. Animal Studies on Endocrine Disruption
Several animal studies have linked exposure to EDCs to
reproductive and developmental problems, as well as to
cancer. 18 While inferring human health risks from animal
studies has often been controversial, the EPA has noted
that the hypothesis that humans are being harmed by
EDCs "is supported by obsetvations of similar effects in
aquatic and wildlife species. In other words, a common
10. See ENDoCRINE DISRUPI'OR SCREENING AND TEsnNG ADVISORY COMM., UNITED
SrA"IES ENVIRONMENTAL PROIECI10N AGENCY, FINAL REPORT 2-1 (1998) Oast modified
Jan. 19, 1999) <http:/ /www.epa.gov/opptlntr/opptendo> [hereinafter EDSTAC
,REPORT).

11. See fd.
12. See fd. at 2-2 (explaining that as many as 50 to 100 genes In a cell may be
controlled by the binding of a single type of hormone to the receptors In the cell).
13. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 74.
14. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 14. See also Kavlock, supra note 1, at 721.
15. SeeEPARISKAssESSMENTFORUM, supra. note 9, at 13.
·
16. See fd. at 14.
17. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 84-85.
18. See generally fd., chapter 10 at 167. See also EPA RisK AssESSMENT FORUM,
supra note 9, at 54-78.
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theme runs through both human and wildlife reports. "19
Alligators in Lake Apopka, Flortda, provide one of the
most well-known examples of reproductive problems that
may be linked to endocrine disruption. The alligators were
exposed to a mixture of DDT, 20 DDE, 21 dicofol, chlorobenzilate, and dicholorobenzophenone from a 1980 chemical
spill. 22 These suspected EDCs have among them both estrogenic and anti-androgenic (inale hormone blocking)
properties. 23 Scientists found that the male alligators were
demasculinized, with penises one half to one-fourth normal
size. 24 Male hatchlings were found to have a ratio of estradiol (a form of estrogen) to testosterone of four times the
normal male ratio, 25 and female hatchlings were "superfeminized," with an estradiol/testosterone ratio twice as
high as normal. 26 There were severe hatching problems
among the alligators: only 5% to 20% of the eggs in each
examined nest hatched, compared to a normal hatching
rate of 65% to 80%. 27
Rodent studies have also linked EDCs to developmental
and reproductive disorders. 28 The EPA has concluded that
"[c]onvincing evidence exists in rodents that exposure to
chemicals that have estrogenic activity, reduce androgen
levels, or otherwise interfere with the action of androgen
during development can cause male reproductive system
abnormalities that include reduced sperm production capability and reproductive tract abnormalities. "29 One rodent
study involved administering vinclozolin, a fungicide, to
pregnant rats. 30 Scientists found that male offspring had
impaired penis development, existence of vaginal pouches,
prostate gland problems, and reduced or absent sperm pro19. ld. at 5.
20. Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane.

21. Bis(4-chlorophenyl)-l,ldichloroethene. DDE is a DDT metabolite (breakdown product).
22. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 65-66 for discussion of
the Lake Apopka studies.
23. See Toppari et al.• supra note 2, at 756.
24. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 66.
25. See id.
26. ld.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 7-8.
29. Id. at 3.
30. See id. at 35.
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duction - all characteristic of interference with the receptors for male hormones. 31
Scientists have conducted numerous other laboratocy and
epidemiological studies on EDCs' effects on rodents, birds,
fish, seals, and other animals. 32 The research is too abundant to discuss in detail here. The EPA has summarized
this animal research, however, by stating that "numerous
reports indicate a variety of compounds can modulate the
endocrine system and affect reproduction and development
in invertebrates, fish, and wildlife . . . ."33
C. Health Effects of Endocrine Disruption in Humans
While the data from animal studies are suggestive, the
impact of EDCs on human health and reproduction is of
course the more important issue from a legal perspective.
EDCs have been associated in scientl.flc literature with a
wide variety of human health problems, including reduced
fertility, birth defects, cancer, endometriosis (a disease of
the uterus), malformed reproductive organs, glandular disfunction, and neurological disorders. 34 The evidence on
human health risks. from EDCs has been controversial, and
the studies are not conclusive, but the research conducted
to date offers disturbing warnings that EDCs may pose a
hazard to human health.
One of the most widely publicized human heal,th effects
hypothesized to be caused by EDCs is a reduced sperm
count. Some scientists believe that adult sperm counts
may be lowered by exposure of male fetuses to synthetic
estrogenic chemicals in the womb. 35 A 1992 article in the
British Medical Journal reviewed sixty-one studies involving
almost fifteen thousand men in over a dozen countries and
concluded that sperm counts had dropped forty-five percent
31. See id.
32. See id. at 56-77.
33. Id. at 8-9.
34. See generally id. at 21-54.
35. See id. at 36. See also Elisabeth Carlsen et al., Declining Semen Quality and
Increasing Incidence of Testicular Cancer: Is 7here a Coll111lDn Cause?, 103 ENvrL.
HEALni PERSPECnVES, Supplement 7, 137-138 (1995). (Discussing possible causal
biological mechaniSill!J and concluding that "(t)he physiological basis for a possible
role of estrogens in male reproductive dysfunction seems to be feasible," but that
"(i)t should be remembered that the estrogen hypothesis remains to be tested. • Id.
at 138.)
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from 1938 to 1990. 36 Older men (born in decades when
there were fewer synthetic chemicals) appear to have higher
sperm counts than younger men, "lend[ing) support to the
concept that adverse prenatal factors may influence the
sperm production capacity in adult life. "37 Other researchers have criticized the methodology of the sperm count
studies or have found no decline in sperm counts in independent tests, 38 but the most recent U.S. study found that
sperm counts in the United States have declined by an average rate of about 1.5o/o per year over the past five decades.39
Some scientists believe endocrine disruption has contributed to increasing rates of cancer of the testicles and prostate gland. 40 Both tissues are hormone-sensitive. The reported incidence of testicular cancer in the United States
increased 45.4o/o between 1973 and 1995,41 and testicular
cancer is now the most common cancer among men ages 25
to 34. 42 The reported incidence of prostate cancer increased
119.6o/o between 1973 and 1995. 43
Summarizing the data on male reproductive disorders,
the Danish scientist Jorma Toppari concludes that "[a]ll of
the best evidence available points with some certainty to a
rising tide in Europe and many other countries of human
male reproductive disorders involving sperm counts (and
probably sperm quality), testicular cancer, malformation of

36. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 172-173. See also Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 742 (also discussing the original study).
37. Toppari et al., supra note 2, at 743.
38. See EPA RISK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra. note 9, at 36-37. See also, Stephen
H. Safe, Envirorunental and Dietary Estrogens and Hwnan Health: Is There a ProblemJ, 103 ENVIL. HEALTII PERSPECnVES 346, 347 (1995). (Noting that this hypothesis was not based on experimental measurements of increased levels of estrogenic compounds in men and discussing reports that reevaluated data to
dispute declines in sperm count).
39. See Andrew Boswer. Decline in Spenn Density May be Even Worse Than Reported, UROLOGY TIMES, February 1998, at 1 (discussing California Department of
Health Services Study).
40. See EPA RisK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 39, 42.
41. See Ries et al., National Cancer Institute, SEER Cancer Statistics Review,
1973-1995 Table XXIV-1
(1998) Oast modified January 21, 1999)
<http:/ /www.seer.ims.nci.nih.gov/Publlcations/CSR7395>.
42. See EPA RISK AssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 39. See also Toppart et
al .. supra note 2, at 743.
43. See Ries et al., supra note 41, at Table XXII-I.
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the external genitalia, and possibly testicular maldescent. 0944
Toppari asserts that "[a]ll of the described changes in male
reproductive health appear interrelated and may have a
common origin in fetal life or childhood, "45 but ultimately
determines that "[t]here are insufficient data to prove or
disprove that these adverse changes in male reproductive
health are the result, wholly or partially, of exposure to environmental estrogens. "46
The evidence of adverse health effects of EDCs in adult
women has been controversial. Some scientists have linked
PCBs and dioxin, both suspected EDCs, to endometriosis,
but later studies appear to refute this hypothesis. 47 Other
studies have linked chlorinated organic compounds such as
DDT and PCBs, which exhibit weak estrogenicity, to an increased risk of breast cancer, 46 but these studies have been
criticized and other evidence is conflicting. 49 There is scientific consensus, however, on the basic point that a
"causal relationship [exists] between female breast cancer
and hormonal activity" in general. 50 Reported cases of
breast cancer increased 25.2o/o between 1973 and 1995, 51
and the most notable increase has been in postmenopausal women with estrogen-responsive tumors, that
is, tumors that grow when exposed to estrogen or estrogenic
chemicals. 52 Numerous studies have found a link between
rodent exposure to EDCs and disruption of the timing of
menstrual cycles, the development of ovarian follicles, and
the speed of embryo transport through fallopian tubes, all
of which affect female rat fertility. 53 There is no data on
whether human females are experiencing reduced fertility
44. Topparl et al .• supra note 2, at 764.
45. Id. at 768.
46. Id. at 764.
47. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supmnote 9, at 28-29.
48. See Wolff, M.S .• Pesticides - How Research has Succeeded and FaUed in Informing Policy: DDT and the Link with Breast Cancer, 103 ENvr'L. HEALTii
PERSPEC11VES, Supplement 6, 87-91 (1995) (discussing four recent small studies
suggesting link between breast cancer and organochlorine levels in the body and
noting that much further research is necessary).
49. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supm note 9, at 30. See also Safe, supm
note 38, at 346-347 (discussing studies that dispute the association).
50. Kavlock et al., supm note 1, at 718.
51. See Ries et al., supra note 41, at Table 11-1.
52. See COlBORN ET AL., supm note 3, at 182-183.
53. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supm note 9, at 22-25.
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due to EDCs, however. A recent study found that girls are
entering puberty at an increasingly early age and suggested
that EDCs, .in mimicking natural hormones, may be a
cause. 54
The greatest health risks from EDCs are probably not to
adult males or females, but to human fetuses exposed in
utero to EDCs taken into the mother's body. Fetuses are
particularly vulnerable to EDCs because development and
sexual differentiation depend on low-dose hormonal signals
received at precise times during gestation. The formation of
the testicles in the male fetus around the seventh week of
gestation and their first release of testosterone are the key
steps in male sexual differentiation, 55 as prior to that time
fetuses have uilisex gonads. 56 The EPA states that "[t]he
development of the male reproductive system pre- and
postnatally appears to be particularly susceptible [to hormone disruption] and uniquely sensitive. "57 Problems in
sexual differentiation, such as undescended testicles, incomplete penis development, or the presence of rudimentaiy components of the female reproductive tract, could occur when the hormonal signals in genetic male fetuses are
disturbed by exogenous chemicals. 56
D. DES as a Scientific Parallel for EDCs
The best data on the possible effects of EDCs on male and
female fetuses come from the sons and daughters of women
who took diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy. A
synthetic estrogen that also has anti-androgenic properties, 59 DES was given to 4.8 million women in the United
States from the late 1940's to the early 1970's to prevent
54. See Marcia E. Hennan-Giddens et al., Secondary Sexual Characteristics and
Menses in Young Girls Seen in O.ffice Practice: A Study from the Pediatric Research
in O.ffice Setttngs Network, 99 PEDIATRICS 505 (1997) (study of 17.077 girls finding
that 48.3% of African-American girls and 14.7% of white girls had begun breast
and/or pubic hair development by age 8). This contrasts with earlier studies
showing development at later ages. The authors urged investigation into whether
the early onset of puberty is related to increasing use of plastics and pesticides
that have estrogen-related physiological effects. Id. at 511.
55. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 43-44.
56. See id. at 42.
57. EPA RrSKAssESSMENr FORUM, supra note 9, at 33.
58. See id. at 33-34.
59. See id. at 38.
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miscarriages and other pregnancy complications. 60 The
daughters of women who took DES exhibited increased
rates of a rare form of vaginal cancer called clear-cell adenocarcinoma, 61 and also showed increased rates of adenosis
(abnormal vaginal or cervical growths), T-shaped uteri,
damaged cervixes, miscarriages; and ectopic pregnancies. 62
The DES daughters represent the strongest evidence to date
that maternal exposures to synthetic estrogen-mimicking
chemicals can lead to cancer and reproductive disorders in
offspring.
DES has also caused harmful effects in male offspring.
1\vo controlled studies of DES-exposed sons showed increased incidences of genital malformation, testicular disorders, and smaller-than-average penises, 63 all consistent
with in utero exposure to an estrogenic chemical during development of male sexual characteristics. Overall reproductive tract abnormality in the DES sons was 32%, versus
8% in controls, 54 and sperm count in the DES-exposed sons
was 79% that of the non-exposed control group. 65 Cryptorchidism (undescended testicles) has also been observed to
occur more frequently in DES-exposed sons. 66
Starting in the mid-1970's, DES-exposed children began
to file lawsuits against DES manufacturers seeking damages for cancer and reproductive abnormalities. Just as the
DES experience has provided the scientific community with
the best available data on the effects of endocrine disrupting chemicals on fetal development and reproductive abilities of offspring, it also provides the legal community with
the principal precedents for intergenerational lawsuits involving endocrine disruption. The DES litigation is discussed in more detail below. 67

60. See Toppart et al .• supra note 2, at 753.
61. See Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation UabUity: A Proximate Cause,
18 CARDozo L. REv. 1217, 1221 (1996).
62. See id.
63. See EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 38.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 754.
67. See infra Part V(B).
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E. Implications of the Scientific Research
Because scientific inquiry into endocrine disruption is
relatively recent, it is not yet possible to demonstrate a
causal link between a particular EDC and a given health or
reproductive disorder. Numerous associational links have
been established, however, and the rise in breast, prostate,
and testicular cancer, as well the increasing rate of undescended testicles and declining sperm counts, are cause for
concern. The EPA explains that "[w]ith few exceptions (e.g.,
DES), a causal relationship between exposure to a specific
environmental agent and an adverse effect on human
health operating via an endocrine disruption mechanism
has not been established ...sa Even Our Stolen Future acknowledges that "[i]t will never be possible to establish a
definitive cause-and-effect connection with [endocrine disrupting) contaminants in the environment. "69
The absence of conclusive causal links, however, does not
mean that the legal and regulatory communities should ignore the dangers of EDCs. Although further research is
necessary to understand EDC risks, exposure routes, and
mechanisms of harm, the studies linking EDCs to reproductive disorders and other health problems in animals and
humans suggest that precautionary legal responses should
at least be considered. Though the health effects of EDCs
seem to be more subtle than those of DES, the DES experience should seiVe as a warning of the damage that EDCs
may be causing to the human population.
If the scientific case against EDCs grows stronger over the
next few years, courts and/or regulatory agencies may respond even if they do not have conclusive evidence of
cause-and-effect relationships. Certainly, tort law has
never required absolute proof of causation in to.xics cases, 70
68. EPA RISK AssESSMENT FORUM, supra note 9, at 6.
69. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 196. Elaborating on causation problems,
Colborn and her colleagues explain that "(a]lthough we know that every mother in
the past half century has carried a load of synthetic chemicals and exposed her
children in the womb, we do not know what combination of chemicals any individual child was exposed to, or at what levels. or whether he or she was hit during
critical periods in their development when relatively low levels might have sign1flcant lifelong effects.· Id.
70. See infra Part V(A) for a discussion of causation in toxic tort cases generally
and in potential EDC litigation in particular.
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and regulatory agencies should require an even lower standard of proof than the courts before considering precautionary regulation of environmental pollutants. 71
Courts and regulatory agencies have frequently faced the
challenge of evaluating new risks about which there is scientific controversy. This challenge arises because technology evolves at a rapid pace, much faster than the law, and
continually creates new risks along with its benefits. Some
obseiVers advocate caution in crafting legal responses to
new or newly-identified risks, advising restraint until the
data are more conclusive or until there is greater scientific
consensus. Regarding EDCs, for example, John Holtzman
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association maintains that
"[l]eap[ing) from theory to public policy is pretty risky when
there are multiple interpretations of what the data mean. "72
Peter Huber, a leading critic of the U.S. regulatory system,
has suggested that the law overreacts to new risks and disregards the hazards of older, established technologies. 73
Judge Posner's dictum that "[l]aw lags science; it does not
lead it"74 rightfully cautions against overzealous legal responses to new risks, especially from the courts.
Protection of public health, however, often requires action
in the face of uncertainty. Law should not lead science, but
neither should government officials ignore clear danger signals. This article acknowledges the preliminary nature of
scientific findings regarding endocrine disruption and examines the potential for regulatory action and litigation in
the context of scientific understanding becoming stronger
71. Compared to tort judgments, regulation is more appropriate to address uncertain risks and causal mechanisms. For example, regulations might impose
minimal restrictions on uses of a chemical when there is some evidence, but not
conclusive evidence, that the chemical causes harm. Tort law's remedy of fully
shifting injury costs should be imposed only when there is more substantial proof
of causation.
72. Cynthia Crossen, Clamorous Pro and Con Campaigns Herald Book's Launch,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 7, 1996 at Bl.
73. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 CoLUM. L.REv. 277, 307-314 (1985) (arguing that courts
focus on new risks from new technology, ignoring potentially greater risks from
existing, accepted technology).
74. Rosen v. Ciba-Getgy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 73 (1996). (Ruling that expert scientific testimony on link between
nicotine patch and heart attack was not valid scientific evidence and inadmissible).
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over the next several years. Many observers of the endocrine disruption issue believe that the present state of scientific knowledge is too limited to support a legal response.
Because the research conducted to date raises serious
questions about the risks of EDCs, however, it is appropriate to examine the legal and regulatm:y tools that might be
used to respond to EDC risks should the scientific case
against EDCs continue to strengthen.
·
III. TYPES OF SUSPECTED EDCs
Since World War II, society has witnessed a "chemical
revolution" in which the production and use of synthetic
chemicals has increased dramatically. Although we have
undeniably benefited from new chemicals in areas such as
medicine, agriculture, and packaging, many chemicals are
known carcinogens and others may be hazardous but have
not been adequately tested.
The overwhelming majority of chemicals in use in the
United States have never been required to be tested for
health risks. While our primary toxics statute, the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, 75 permits the EPA
to mandate testing of chemicals, it has been largely ineffective because it creates burdensome factual and legal hurdles for the EPA before the agency can take regulatory action.76 Since the passage of the Act, EPA has developed
testing rules for less than one percenf7 of the 75,000 synthetic chemicals currently listed on EPA's Toxic Substances
Inventory. 78 Even when a chemical is tested pursuant to
TSCA, it is the manufacturer, and not the EPA, that performs the actual testing. We are essentially "flying blind"79
in permitting the marketing and use of thousands of chemicals with very little information about their health impacts.
·It is partly because so few chemicals are required to be
tested that scientists are just beginning to understand the
properties and risks of EDCs. Over fifty chemicals are sus75. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
76. See infra Part N for a further discussion ofTSCA
77. DAVID ROE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FuND, TOXIC IGNORANCE 26 (1997).
<http:/ I www.ecif.org/pubs I reports/ toxicfgnorance I index.html>.
78. See EDSTAC REPORr, supra note 10, at 2-10.
79. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 239; see generally id., chapter 14.
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pected of being EDCs, 80 though estimates vary and identification research is still ongoing. Much of the research into
endocrine disruption has focused on a few classes of
chemicals, such as PCBs or DDT, which scientists pave already studied for other reasons. 81 The main classes of
EDCs are described below:
Organochlorine Pesticides: This category includes DDT,
DDE, and dicofol, as well as the pesticides perthane, aldrin,
chlordane, heptachlor, and hexachlorobenzene. 82 The pesticides dieldrin, endosulfan, methoxychlor, and kepone are
also suspected EDCs. 83 While the EPA severely r~strtcted
use of DDT in 1972,84 other countries still produce and use
it. DDT has a chemical structure similar to DES, 85 and
DDT persists in the U.S. environment because it and its
break-down products accumulate in wildlife86 and stay in
the foodchain. 87 One DDT break-down product, DDE, has
been found to be an androgen receptor antagonist, blocking
the binding of natural male hormones to their receptors. 88
DDE can cross the placenta to reach developing human
fetuses and has been shown to inhibit male sexual characteristics in rats. 89 Other organochlorine pesticides still used
on crops have both estrogenic and anti-androgenic effects, 90
and some studies have suggested a link between body levels
of organochlorine pesticides and breast cancer. 91

80.
81.
82.
83.

See COLBORN ET AL.• supra note 3. at 81.
See id.
See Toppart et al., supra note 2. at 756.
See Thomas E. Weise & William R Kelce, An Introduction to Environmental
Oestrogens, CHEMISI'RY AND INDUSTRY, August 18, 1997.

84. 37 Fed. Reg. 13,369 (1972).
.
85. See CoLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 69 (diagramming structures).
86. See Richard L. Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to
Regulate Toxic Substances That Can Bioaccwnu1ate, 20 EcOLOGY L.Q. 605, 609613 (1993) (listing organochlorine pesticides and PCBs as substances with a
"high" or "very high" capacity to accumulate in the fatty lipids of wildlife as the
chemicals are passed up the food chain).
87. See id. at 609, 612.
88. See Kelce et al., Persistent DUI' Metabolite p,p'-DDE is a Potent Androgen Receptor Antagonist, 375 NATIJRE 581 (June 15, 1995).
89. See id.
90. See Toppart et al., supm note 2, at 756-757.
91. See Wolff, supm note 48, at 88-89.
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Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs): PCBs are industrtal
chemicals that have been used since 1929 as heat transfer
and hydraulic fluids, adhesives, flame retardants, dielectrtc
fluids for electrtcal equipment, and waxes. 92 Congress
banned most production of PCBs in 1976, 93 but like DDT.
PCBs persist in the environment and in the food chain, especially in fish that live in polluted waters. 94 PCBs have
both estrogenic and anti-androgenic effects. 95 Dioxin, a
form of PCB whose cancer-causing properties were brought
to public attention in the early 1980's by the contamination
of Times Beach, Missouri, is also a suspected EDC. 96 Dioxin is produced as a byproduct of incineration, paper and
pulp bleaching, and emissions from steel foundries and
motor vehicles. 97
Alkylphenol Etlwxylates (APEs): APEs, which are estrogenic, are used widely in detergents, paints, herbicides,
pesticides, and cosmetics. 98 Over 300 million kilograms of
APEs are produced annually worldwide. 99 APEs accumulate
in rivers, entering the water directly from fields or through
sewage treatment plants, and they also accumulate in the
bodies of fish and birds. 100 British studies have indicated
that thirty percent of drinking water in the United Kingdom
is taken from rivers contaminated with APEs. 101 Denmark
has already phased out most uses of APEs because of their
endocrine disrupting properties. 102 One APE, nonylphenol
ethoxylate, also known as nono:xynol-9, is widely used as a
spermicide and condom lubricant. 103

92. See Toppari et al .• supra note 2, at 757.
93. See Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1994).
94. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 26.
95. See Toppari et al., supra note 2, at 757.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 758.
99. See id.
100. See Michael Warhurst, Hormone Disrupting Chemicals Website, (last modified Nov. 25, 1998) <http:/ /easyweb.easynet. co.uk/-mwarhurst>.
101. See Peter Fairley et al., Endocrine Disruptors: Sensationalism or Science?,
CHEMICAL WEEK, May 8, 1996 at 29.
102. See fd.
103. See Weise & Kelce, supra note 83.
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Phthalates: This class of suspected EDCs is found in vinyl

products, paint, and plastics (including plastic films used
for food packaging), as well as in processed foods such as
cheese, margarine, and baby formula. 104 One type of
phthalate, DEHP (diethylhexylphthalate}, is believed to be a
testicular toxicant. 105 Another common type, BBP (butylbenzylphthalate), is estrogenic and has been associated
with reduced sperm production and testicle size in male
rats exposed in utero and in early life to levels close to calculated human levels of exposure. 106
Bisphenol-A: Bisphenol-A has an estrogenic effect and has
been found to cause estrogen-sensitive breast cancer cells
to proliferate. 107 The chemical has gained particular notoriety because it is used widely in the packaging industry in
products such as plastic water bottles and in the inner
coating of food cans and bottle caps. 108 Very low levels of
Bisphenol-A have been shown to cause endocrine disruption. In one study, doses of two micrograms per kilogram of
body weight given to pregnant mice resulted .in male offspring with prostate glands 30o/o larger than male offspring
in control groups. 109 Bisphenol-A is used in some dental
fillings, where concentrations of 5-30 micrograms per milliliter have been found in saliva one hour after a filling. 110
Phytoestrogens: Phytoestrogens are naturally-occurring
estrogenic and anti-estrogenic chemicals found in plants,
including edible plants such as spinach, sprouts, and soybeans.u1 Because soybeans are used so widely in food
products, including infant formula, they may be a major
104. SeeWarhurst. supra note 100.
105. See AMDUR ET AL., CASAREIT AND Douu:s TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SciENCE OF
POISONS 499 (1991).
106. See RM. Sharpe et al.• Gestational and Lactational Exposure of Rats to Xenoestrogens Results in Reduced Testicular Size and Spenn Production, 103 ENvn..
HEAL1li PERSPECTIVES 1136-1143 (1995).
107. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 135.
108. See td..
109. See Weise & Kelce, supra note 83.
110. See td..
111. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 80. OUR SToLEN FuroRE suggests that
plants may have developed phytoestrogenic properties through evolution as a
means to disrupt the endocrine systems. and thus the reproduction. of predator
animals. Id. at 76-77.

306

COLUMBIA JOU~AL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:289

source of human EDC intake. 112
These categories of suspected EDCs are not exhaustive. A
number of other chemical types are under investigation,
and scientists simply do not know the full range of chemicals that may cause endocrine disruption. Faced with this
lack of knowledge about the health effects of most chemicals, the EPA's Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing
Advisory Committee (EDSTAC) recommends investigating
87,000 different chemicals for endocrine disrupting effects.113
To be sure, some chemicals that affect the endocrine
system have positive applications, including those used for
birth control, treatment of osteoporosis and ·heart disease,
and therapies for prostate and breast cancer. 114 Scientists
are still trying to understand which types and degrees of
impacts on the. endocrine system cause harm and which
cause no effect or have net benefits.
An important question from both the scientiftc and legal
perspectives is whether the amount of human exposure to
EDCs is sufficient to cause harm, especially given that
EDCs are generally less potent than natural hormones.
The estrogenic activity of DDT in the environment, for example, is one thousand to one million times less potent
than natural estradiol' in the body. 115 A study funded in
part by the Chemical Manufacturers Association found that
the daily dose of estrogen-equivalent from a birth control
pill was 6.67 billion times greater than the expected daily
dose from organochlorine compounds in the environment. 116
Toppart and his colleagues respond that "[w]hile exposure
levels to estrogenic chemicals are not at all well-known for
humans, the large number of chemicals in numerous envi112. See Toppart et al., supm note 2, at 758. See also Weise & Kelce, supm
note 83. The EDSTAC has recommended inclusion of naturally occurring estrogens in a screening and te~ting program because they are ubiquitous and because
they may have additive and antagonistic effects with other hormonally active
chemicals. SeeEDSTAC REPORT, supranote 10, at 7-10.
113. EDSTAC REPORT, supra note 10, at ES-3. For further discussion of
EDSTAC, see Part N(C)(l), infra.
114. See id. at 3-6.
115. See Toppari et al, supm note 2, at 756.
116. Safe, supm note 38, at 349.
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ronmental categories suggests adequate availability.'' 117
That some suspected EDCs can accumulate in fish and
wildlife may heighten human dietary exposure. as "biomagnificatlon" in the food chain can concentrate chemicals in
fish and wildlife to levels as much as one mill1on times
higher than the ambient concentration in water or land environments. 118
An additional consideration is that fetuses might be damaged by levels of EDCs that would not harm adults because
homeostatic mechanisms that maintain hormonal balance
are not well-developed in fetuses. 119 Also. fetal hormone receptors might not be as discriminating among hormones as
adult receptors. 120 Finally. it might be misleading to put too
much weight on the potency of EDCs compared to natural
hormones. Because natural hormones can modulate cell
activity in concentrations in the parts-per-trtllion range. a
less potent hormone concentrated in the bloodstream in the
parts-per-bill1on range or less might still have deleterious
effects. 121
N. POTENfiAL REGULATION OF EDCs
A.

Current Endocrine Disruption Programs

Over the past few years. several federal agencies have
launched programs to examine the risks of EDCs and to
develop testing, screening, and research recommendations.
From the public literature. it appears that no government
agency is currently considering regulatory action beyond
testing and screening. The federal government effort is coordinated by the Committee on Environment and Natural
Resources (CENR) of the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC). 122 The CENR's working group on endocrine
117. Topparl et al.• supra note 2, at 769.
118. See Williamson et al .• supra note 86. at 614.
119. SeeEPARisKAssESSMENTFORUM, supranote9, at 19-20.
120. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 74.
121. See td. See Gina Solomon. Endocrine Disruptors, What Should We Do Noufl
(Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.nrdc.org/nrdc/nrdcpro/present/gs031997.htm1>.
122. See UNrrED STAn:5 ENviRONMENTAL PROTEC'l10N AGENCY, ENDOCRINE
DISRUPI'ORS
REsEARCH
INmATIVE
FACT
SHEET
(Nov.
25,
1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/endocrine/edrifact.html>.
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disruption includes representatives from the White House,
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,
Centers for Disease Control, Department of Agriculture, and
a number of other federal agencies. 123
International efforts to regulate endocrine disruptors have
evolved considerably over the past five years. In June and
July of 1998, representatives from over one hundred countries met in Montreal to begin negotiations on a global
treaty to regulate Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs):
toxic chemicals that persist in the environment and that
can be transported globally through water and air pollution
and the migration of species. 124 Many of the twelve POPs on
which the negotiators focused efforts, such as chlordane,
DDT, heptachlor, and PCBs, are also suspected endocrine
disruptors. 125 The United States has already banned or restricted most of the twelve chemicals, but it is participating
actively in the negotiations because of the government's
concern about environmental transport of the chemicals
from other countries. 126 Conducted under the auspices of
the United Nations Environment Programme, the treaty negotiations are expected to be completed in the year 2000. 127
It is currently unclear whether the global treaty will involve
restrictions, phase-outs, or different requirements for the
developed and developing world. 126 Assuming that the
treaty is completed and that it is . ratified by the Senate,
domestic legislation might still be needed to implement the
123. See id.
124. See Joby Warrick, 120 Cowttrles to Try to Reach Pact on Phaseout of Toxic
Compounds, WASH. Posr. June 28, 1998, atA3.
125. The twelve chemicals are aldrin. chlordande, DDT. dieldrin, dioxins. endrin, furans, heptachlor. hexachlorobenzene, mtrex. PCBs, and toxaphene. See
United Nations Environment Programme, Press Release, "Treaty talks start on
persistent organic pollutants," (June 29, 1998) <http:/ /lrptc.unep.ch/pops/POPs_
Inc/press_releases/fnfokfte.html#treaty>.
126. See Warrick, supra note 124 (quoting Rafe Pomerance, the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for the environment. as stating that *(m)any of
these problems we cannot solve alone. They exist and are created outside our
borders.").
127. UNEP Press Release, supra note 125.
128. See UNEP document "The international community's response to POPs."
(June 1998)<1rptc. unep.ch/pops/POPs_Inc/press_releases/fnfokfte.html#
response> (descrtbing special needs of developing countrtes. the possibility of
technology transfers, and possible treaty provisions including bans on certain
chemicals and provisions to promote release reductions).
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treaty. Such legislation could become controversial, especially if the treaty regime restricts additional chemicals currently mass-marketed in the United States.
In the United States, the Environmental Protection
Agency has taken the lead on endocrine disruption initiatives. In 1996, the EPA's Office of Prevention, Pesticides,
and Toxic Substances (OPPI'S) established the Endocrine
Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee
(EDSTAC) to "provid[e] direction to the Agency on the establishment of a comprehensive screening and testing program for pesticides and chemicals for estrogenic and other
endocrine effects. "129 The screening program planned by the
EDSTAC was mandated by Congress in the Food Quality
Protection Act (FQPA), 130 signed into law on August 3, 1996,
and by amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), 131 signed into law on August 6, 1996.
In the FQPA, Congress required the EPA to determine
"whether certain substances may have an effect . . . similar ... to a naturally occurring estrogen, or such other endocrine effect as the Administrator may designate. "132 Congress directed the EPA to screen all registered pesticides
and any other substance that may have an effect that is
"cumulative" to an effect of a pesticide, 133 and the amendments to the SDWA gave the EPA authority to screen any
other substance that may be found in drinking water
sources and that may have an endocrine-disrupting effect. 134 Although chemical manufacturers will conduct the
actual testing, Congress gave the EPA authority to suspend
sale or distribution of a chemical if a finn fails to submit
the requested testing data. 135
In the FQPA, Congress placed the endocrine screening
129. U.S. ENviRONMENTAL PROTECnON AGENCY, OFFICE OF PREvENilON,
PEsTICIDES, AND TOXIC SUBSrANCES, FOOD QUAUIY PROTECnON Acr IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN, (Mar. 1997), at 4.7 <http://www.pestlaw.com/guide/EPA-70300B.html>.
130. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170.
131. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182.
132. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(l) (Sl:lPP· 1997).
133. Id. at§ 346a(p)(3).
134. See42 U.S.C. § 300j-17 (Supp. 1996). The EDSfAC decided to expand the
scope of the screening program to include "all environmental agents~ and is prioritizing which agents to screen first.
See FooD QUAUIY PROTECriON Acr
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 129, at 4.7.
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(5) (Supp. 1997).
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program on a very tight schedule, requiring the EPA to develop the screening procedures within two years of enactment (i.e., by mid-1998), 136 and to implement the program
within three years of enactment (i.e., by mid-1999). 137 By
mid-2000, the EPA is required to report to Congress on its
findings, recommendations for further testing of EDCs, and
recommendations for possible regulatory action. 138 Because
the EPA cannot possibly screen every commercial chemical
within that time-period, it must prioritize which chemicals
and pesticides will be screened first, and it is requesting
voluntary industry compliance with the screening program
in order to meet the statutory deadlines. Lynn Goldman,
former Assistant EPA Administrator for OPPI'S, explained in
1996 that "if we have to do this through rule-making processes it will take an inordinate amount of time and effort. "139
Most importantly from a regulatory perspective, Congress
gave the EPA wide latitude to take protective measures
against EDCs. If the EPA finds that a certain chemical does
have an "endocrine effect," the FQPA directs the EPA Administrator, "as appropriate," to "take action under such
statutory authority as is available to the Administrator ...
to ensure the protection of public health. "140 Congress did
not provide new regulatory authority with this provision,
but this provision does demonstrate that Congress anticipated that some regulation of EDCs might be necessary
under existing statutes. The question naturally arises,
then, of whether the current statutes governing toxic
chemicals are adequate to address the risks of EDCs.
B. Current Statutory Authority to Regulate EDCs
Because EDCs are found in pesticides, food, air, water,
occupational settings, and consumer products, an enormous variety of statutes could potentially be relevant in any
regulatory regime for EDCs. These include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Food,
136.
1998.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at§ 346a(p)(l). EDSTAC released its final report on schedule in August
Id. at§ 346a(p)(2).
See td. at§ 346a(p)(7).
Fairley et al., supra note 101 at 36.
21 U.S.C. § 346a(p)(6) (Supp. 1997).
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA}, the Clean Air Act (CAA},
the Clean Water Act (CWA}, the Safe Drtnking Water Act
(SDWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA}, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA}, and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). The federal government,
rather than the states, has taken primacy responsibility for
toxic chemical regulation, 141 and the Environmental Protection Agency sets the regulatory standards for most of the
federal toxics statutes. 142 This discussion will therefore focus on the EPA.
Regulating EDCs under existing statutes would be problematic for a number of reasons. The existing statutory regime for toxic chemicals has many flaws, including fragmented agency authority, 143 media-specific approaches, 144
inconsistent lists of chemicals regulated under different
statutes, 145 command-and-control methodology, 146 and
chemical-by-chemical standard setting. 147 Proceeding under
existing statutes,· then, will merely replicate in the EDC
context the same flaws that have plagued regulation of
141. States play a limited role in federal environmental regulation. For example,
they grant permits and develop Implementation plans for federal standards under
statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. See Williamson et al.,
supra note 86, at 646-647 & n.204.
142. EPA shares regulatory authority under the FDCA with the Food and Drug
Administration, for example. OSHA, which regulates exposure to toxic chemicals
in the workplace, is Implemented by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The CPSA is Implemented by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
143. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 643-644 (stating that most fields
regulated by the U.S. government, from aircraft safety to television and radio
broadcasting, fall under a single statute, whereas toxic chemicals are regulated
under at least nine statutes).
144. See John C. Dembach, The Urifocused Regulatton of Toxic and Hazardous
PoUutants, 21 HARv. ENVn.. L.REv. 1, 43-45 (1997) (arguing that statutes generally
cover a single medium, such as air or water, and ignore pollutant transport between media).
145. See id. at 1-6 (noting vast inconsistencies in the lists of pollutants regulated under five different toxics statutes and arguing that these inconsistencies
encourage discharges of pollutants regulated under one statute into unregulated
media).
146. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 647 (noting lack of market mechanisms in toxics regulation). See also Richard Stewart. The Future of Environmental
Regulation: United States Environmental Regulation: A FaUing .Parodlgm. 15 J.L. &
COM. 585, 587 (1996) (noting difficulty of gathering information to Implement
command-and-control measures and economic inefficiency of such measures).
147. See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 647 (noting that chemical-bychemical testing leads to highly stringent limitations on a few chemicals, while the
vast majority of chemicals remain unregulated).
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other pollutants. To be sure, U.S. toxics statutes are
broadly written to permit the EPA to take regulatmy action
when new chemical risks are discovered. That is, existing
statutes provide sufficient authority to regulate EDCs. Because of difficulties that will arise in setting standards,
drafting sensible regulations, and defending those regulations in court, however, the overall usefulness of proceeding
under existing statutes to protect public health from EDC
risks is limited. These obstacles would hinder regulatocy
action on the hazards of a given EDC even if there was considerable data.
Regulatocy obstacles are discussed in more detail in Part
IV(C), infra, but first it is useful to outline how regulation of
EDCs might be incorporated into the existing statutocy regime for toxics. This discussion will focus on three major
statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
148

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act provides that-all pesticides must be registered with
the EPA before sale or distribution. 149 Before approving a
registration, the EPA Administrator must find that the pesticide will perform as intended without "any unreasonable
risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of
the use of any pesticide." 150 FIFRA is a classic cost-benefit
balancing statute. The burden is on the pesticide manufacturer to produce sufficient safety information to allow the
EPA to determine that the benefits of the pesticide outweigh
possible hazards. FIFRA also provides the authority to cancel existing pesticide registrations under a similar costbenefit analysis if new information about pesticide hazards
comes to light. 151 In addition, FIFRA grants emergency
FIFRA.

148. 7 u.s.c. §§ 136-136y (1994).
149. Id. at§ 136a(a).
150. /d. at§ 136(bb). The EPA Administrator shall classify a pesticide for restricted use if the pesticide "may generally cause ... unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment, including injury to the applicator." /d. at§ 136a(d)(1)(C).
151. In determining whether to suspend a pesticide registration for unreasonable adverse impacts of the environment, the Administrator must consider the impact on "production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and
otherwise on the agricultural economy." Id. at§ 136d(b). The EPA is currently re-
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authortty to the EPA to immediately suspend registrations
to address an "imminent hazard. "152 In the context of EDCs,
then, FIFRA would provide the EPA with authortty to ban or
limit the use of new or existing pesticides because of endocrtne disrupting effects, as long as such action survived the
rough cost-benefit analysis of the statute. Under the statute, the EPA approves the pesticide labels proposed by registrants, and it would have the power to mandate warnings
about endocrtne disrupting effects on pesticide containers.153
TSCA. 154 The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act is the
broadest of the major toxics statutes, as it applies to all

new non-pesticide chemicals and to non-pesticide chemicals already on the market. Under TSCA, the EPA Administrator can mandate that a manufacturer test any chemical
that "may present an unreasonable rtsk of injury to health
or the environment." 155 Effects for which tests can be mandated include carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis,
behavioral disorders, and cumulative or synergistic effects, 156 all of which could be relevant to EDCs.
In practice, the EPA has focused its chemical testing program on "new" chemicals developed after the passage of the
Act. The vast majortty of so-called "existing" chemicals that
were already in commerce when TSCA was passed, including many suspected EDCs, have never beeri required to be
tested for health rtsks. Even for "new" chemicals, testing is
registering all pesticides registered before November 1, 1984, Id. at§ 136a-l(a), so
older pesticides will be subjected to review over the next decade or so for health
risks, including risks of endocrine disruption.
152. Id. at§ 136d(c). Cancellation procedures can take years, whereas suspension takes effect immediately, but suspension is merely a stopgap measure until
full cancellation hearings can be held. Because of the adversartal nature of cancellation proceedings and court delays, they are used infrequently. Suspected endocrine disruptors such as DDT and Kepone were cancelled (not for their endocrine disrupting effects) under such proceedings. See MARY DEVINE WOROBEC &
GIRARD ORDWAY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL GUIDE 60 (1989).
153. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B) (1994).
154. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
155. Id. at § 2603(a)(l). Testing can also be mandated if the chemical (1) is or
will be produced in substantial quantities or (2) if there will be significant or substantial human exposure or if the chemical will enter the environment in substantial quantities. Id.
156. See td. at§ 2603(b)(2)(A).
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rarely required. An EPA advisory group, noting that the
EPA has ordered testing for only 121 chemicals in twenty
years under TSCA, explains that "[t]his is not an indication
of how much more information might really be needed but,
rather, the administrative challenges of mounting an information request. "157
Although TSCA mandates that companies submit PreManufacture Notifications (PMNs) to the EPA, 158 EPA regulations require submission only of available toxicity data
that is in the company's possession or in scientific literature. 159 Companies are not required to develop their own
toxicity information through testing, and over half of PMNs
are submitted with no toxicity data whatsoever. 160 Consequently, unlike pesticides under FIFRA, most chemicals in
commerce today are being sold without fully developed
safety information and without informed EPA review.
The EPA can restrict a chemical pursuant to TSCA only if
it can reasonably conclude that the chemical "presents an
unreasonable risk of injucy to health or the_ environment. "161
This risk analysis must be balanced with an analysis of the
benefits of the chemical, the availability of substitutes, and
the "reasonably ascertainable economic consequences" of
the regulation. 162 - Available restrictions include limiting
uses or production volumes, mandating warnings, prohibiting manufacture or distribution, or regulating disposal. 163
These restrictions could in theocy ameliorate EDC risks.
The EPA rarely restricts chemicals once they are on the
market, however, because the required cost-benefit analysis
is cumbersome and because regulations must be the "least
burdensome" available to address the risk. 164 In TSCA's
first twenty years, EPA imposed restrictions on only five
types of chemicals. 165
Although TSCA has many limitations, the statute at the
157. EDSTAC REPORr. supra note 10. at 2-11.
158. 15 u.s.c. § 2604 (1994).
159. See 40 C.F.R. § 720.50 (1998) ..
160. See ROE ET AL., supra note 77, at 27.
161. 15 U.S.C. at§ 2605(a).
162. Id. at§ 2605(c)(1).
163. See id. at§ 2605(a).
164. !d.
165. See ROE ET AL., supra note 77, at 28. The chemicals are dioxin, hexavalent
chromium, PCBs, metal fluids, and lead paint. Id.. at n.38.
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very least would provide the basic authority to ban or limit
chemicals or mandate warnings once more information
about the endocrine hazards of individual chemicals becomes available.
FDCA. 166 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the EPA
the responsibility to set "tolerances," or allowable levels, for
pesticide residue on food. 167 Foods that contain pesticide
residue above the established tolerance are considered
adulterated and violate the Act. 168 The agency must set tolerances that are "safe," defined as "a reasonable certainty
that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the
pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable information. "169 This language would provide the
authority to revoke or modify tolerances for pesticides suspected of causing harm through endocrine disruption. That
is, the "harm" that is a precedent for regulatory action is
not defined narrowly as a specific disease or cancer, but
rather is broad enough to encompass reproductive harm,
decreased fertility, or other health problems that have been
linked to EDCs.
Significantly, the FQPA directed the EPA to review all current pesticide tolerances within 10 years. 170 In reviewing
tolerances, the EPA may now consider "whether the pesticide chemical may have an effect in humans that is similar
to an effect produced by a naturally occurring estrogen or
other endocrine effects." 171 Additionally, the FQPA mandated that in setting or reviewing pesticide residue levels,
the Administrator shall assess the health risk based on
"available information concerning the special susceptibility
of infants and children to the pesticide chemical residues,
including . . . effects of in utero exposure to pesticide
166. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-395 (1994).
167. Id. at§ 346a.
168. See id.. at§ 342(a).
169. Id. at§ 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). The Administrator is permitted to set a tolerance
higher than the "safe" level if the pesticide protects against a health risk greater
than the health risk from the residue, or if a higher tolerance "is necessary to
avoid a significant disruption in domestic production of an adequate, wholesome,
and economical food supply. • ld. at § 346a(b)(2)(B)(ill).
170. Id. at § 346a(q)(l).
171. Id. at§ 346a(b)(2)(D)(vill).
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chemicals." 172 The EPA has stated that it will review 10,000
tolerances by 2006 and that pesticides suspected of endocrine disrupting properties and those used on foods most
eaten by children will receive the highest priority. 173 To
some extent, then, concerns about endocrine disruption are
already being incorporated into the existing regulatory regime.
C. Inadequacies of the Current Regulatory Regime
The problem with regulating EDCs within the existing
toxi.cs regulatory framework is not lack of statutory authority. Existing toxi.cs statutes are written broadly enough to
authorize the EPA or other agencies to place restrictions on
EDCs if scientific data support such measures, and the
statutes cover the main exposure routes to EDCs, such as
pesticides, occupational exposure, and drinking water.
Rather, the problems in potential regulation of EDCs will
arise from two other sources: difficulties in risk assessment
and bureaucratic and judicial obstacles.
1. Risk Assessment
The existing risk assessment framework for toxic chemicals is likely to be inadequate for determining the health
risk from a given EDC and for supporting regulatory action
against judicial challenge. 174 As Gina Solomon of the Natural Resources Defense Council writes, "(t]he new problem of
endocrine disruptors shows that business as usual [at the
EPA] will not protect our health." 175
The current risk assessment framework for toxic chemicals is premised on (1) testing single chemicals (2) for car172. Id. at § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)UU.
_
173. See EPA Press Release. Riskiest Pesticides WlU Be Assessed First Under
New Food Safety Act. August 4, 1997 <www.epa.gov/epahome/Press.html>.
174. Risk assessment encompasses four sub-procedures: hazard identification
(linking a chemical to a particular health effect); dose-response assessment (determining the relationship between the magnitude of exposure and the probability
that the health effect will occur); exposure assessment (determining the level of
human exposure to the chemical); and risk characterization (combining the results of the prior steps to determine the overall magnitude of the risk). See
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL REGULATION- LAW, SciENCE, AND POUCY 513-514
(1996). The special characteristics ofEDCs have the potential to raise problems at
each stage of the risk assessment process.
175. Solomon. supra note 121.
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cinogenic effects (3) by extrapolating backward (4) from high
doses (5) given to adult animals. 176 This framework is inadequate for EDC risk assessment for a number of reasons.
First, EDCs can disrupt hormonal pathways and modulate cell activity at extremely low doses, in the parts-perbill1on or parts-per-trtll1on range in the blood stream. 177 The
EPA screening program or other risk assessment activities
might miss these subtle effects, and the low-dose problem
also makes it difficult to set permissible exposures, such as
pesticide tolerances for food under FDCA, because it is not
known if there is a safe "threshold" below which no harmful
effects are expected to occur. 178
Second, EDCs may have an unusual inverted-U-shaped
dose-response cmve in which negative health effects increase as the dosage increases, but above a certain dose the
effects diminish, possibly because hormone receptors become overloaded. 179 University of Missouri endocrinologist
Frederick Vom Saal found this type of dose-response curve
for DES. 180 If this inverted-U-shaped dose-response curve
exists for other EDCs, it would mean that extrapolating
health risks from high doses to low doses, far from exaggerating risks (which is the usual criticism of dose extrapolations), might actually underestimate them. 181 According to
Vom Saal, this would be "the end of risk assessment as we
know it." 182
Third, risk assessment for EDCs is complicated by the
fact that fertility or reproductive disorders are much more
difficult to detect in laboratocy animals than cancerous tu-

176. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 198-209.
177. See text accompanying note 13, supra.
178. See generally, Short Tenn Screen. for Determining Endocrine Modulation May
Not Be Possible, PEsTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS, June 19, 1996 (on difficulties
with developing EDC screening procedures). See also Yvonne Sor, Fertility or Unemployment- Should You Have to Choose?. 1 J .L. & HEALnl 141, 167 (1986-1987)
(discussing lack of evidence regarding threshold levels for chemicals that cause
birth-defects).
179. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 169. Most dose-response curves do
not turn down above a certain dose. That is, the toxic response continues to increase as the dose increases, leading to the risk assessment axiom that "the dose
makes the poison." Id. at 205.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 170.
182. Michael Lerner, Crossed Signals. WHOLE EAiml. June 22, 1997, at 78.
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mors. 183 Not only are such disorders intergenerational in
the case of EDCs, but they are best observed in living animals, so that traditional rtsk assessment procedures that
correlate vartous doses of a chemical to mortality rates in
animals could be inadequate for EDCs.
Finally, because EDCs are thought to have synergistic effects, chemical-by-chemical screening, which is a foundation of our current Iisk assessment process for toxics,
might be inadequate. Yet testing multiple combinations of
synthetic chemicals and natural hormones could be extremely time-consuming.
The EPA's Endocrtne Disruptor Screening and Testing
Advisozy Committee (EDSTAC) is advising EPA on risk assessment techniques for EDCs. Formed in October 1996,
the EDSTAC released its Final Report in August 1998. 184
The report outlines a tiered structure for screening and
testing of chemicals. 185 After initial sorting and prtortty setting stages, Tier 1 screening will identify chemicals capable
of. interacting with estrogen, androgen, or thyroid hormone
systems. 186 Tier 2 testing will then determine whether those
interactions are adverse and will identify, characterize, and
quantify the adverse effects. 187 After either stage, a chemical may be moved to a "hold box," which indicates that the
chemical is not harmful and that no further testing is necessruy.188 The EDSTAC estimates that approximately
87,000 chemicals will need to be screened, 189 an enormous
task given the expense of testing and the time needed for
each test.
183~ See Williamson et al., supra note 86, at 625 ("Proving human teratogenicity
is even more difficult than proving carcinogenicity.").
184. EDSTAC REPORI', supra note 10.
185. See id. at ES-3 to ES-6.
186. See id. at ES-4. Tier 1 screening would be designed for maximum sensittvtty to hormonal effects of chemicals, thus m1n1m1z1ng false negatives. The tests
would include a range of organisms and assess a range of endocrine disruption
endpoints. See id. at ES-11.
187. See id. at ES-14. Tier 2 testing is designed to be more thorough than Tier
1 screening, and a negative outcome in Tier 2 testing would supercede a positive
outcome in Tier 1 screening, thus moving the chemical to the "hold box. • EDSTAC
recommends that Tier 2 testing include a range of organisms in their most sensitive developmental ltfestage and that the tests identify the spectflc hazard caused
by the chemical and establtsh a dose-response relationship. See id. at ES-13.
188. See id. at ES-4.
189. Id.. at ES-3.
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The ESDTAC has developed initial sorting recommendations, based on existing data, which could speed the
screening process by moving a chemical directly to the
"hold box" if it is already known to be benign, or directly to
hazard assessment if it is already known to be a harmful
EDC. 190 For chemicals where existing data are insufficient,
the EDSTAC recommends High Throughput Pre-Screening
(HTPS). 191 HTPS is automated, high-volume sampling which
would provide preliminary hormonal impact information to
assist in placing chemicals in the correct tier. 192 The EPA
has indicated that it will begin the screening program in
1999 using HTPS on 15,000 chemicals. 193
The EDSTAC seems to recognize the difficult· risk assessment challenges posed by EDCs. It recommends, for example, that the EPA develop testing protocols for embryonic
exposure to chemicals, with evaluation of effects in the fully
developed animal. 194 It also recommends that the EPA consider tests that detect multiple hormone interactions and
predict long-term or delayed effects. 195 The EDSTAC did not
address issues of cost to industry or the length of time
needed to develop such sensitive tests, both of which could
be substantial. 196 . Even currently available tests used to
detect the endocrine-modulating activity of a chemical need
to be validated and standardized before they could be used
on a large scale in Tier 1 screening or Tier 2 testing. 197
In October 1998, the EPA accepted the recommendations
of the EDSTAC report. 198 According to EPA Administrator
190. Id. at ES-3 to ES-4.
191. !d. at ES-8.
192. See id. The EDSfAC recommends that HTPS be performed on all chemicals wtth current production volumes above 10,000 pounds per year (approximately 15,000 chemicals). all pesticides, and all chemicals proposed to bypass a
tier for any reason. Id.
.
'
193. See Glenn Hess, Endocrine Disruption Screening WUl .Evaluate 15,000
Chemicals, CHEMICALMARKETREPoRIER. October 12, 1998.
194. EDSfAC REPORratES-12.
195. See id. at 3-6.
196. Gary E. Ttmm, technical advisor to the EPA in the Office of Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, estimates that first tier tests could cost industry
about $200,000 per chemical, whereas second tier tests could cost about $2 million per chemical. See Corinna Wu, Huge Testing Planned for Hormone Mimics;
Endocrine Disruptors, SciENCE NEWS, September 5, 1998.
197. SeeEDSfAC REPORt' at ES-15.
198. See Hess, supra note 193.

320

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:289

Carol Browner, the screening program "is a critical first step
in our efforts to identify any health threats from these substances and ensure that human health and the environment are protected. "199
The EDSTAC was not charged with making recommendations for what types of test results should justify regulatory
action, but moving from risk assessment to risk management will be controversial. Decisions made during the risk
assessment process could potentially affect future regulatory options. There was considerable controversy during
the EDSTAC deliberations, for example, over the basic definition of an endocrine disruptor, 200 with opposing camps
viewing the definition as potentially important to future
regulatory efforts. One camp advocated defining the term
as an exogenous agent that "changes endocrine function
and causes adverse effects .... " Another group of committee members objected to the use of the term "adverse,"
arguing that the term is subjective and that hormone function is so sensitive that any biochemical alteration may lead
to subtle but serious pathologies later in life or in subsequent generations. 201 A definition emphasizing WlY hormone effects, and not just demonstrably adverse ones,
could potentially lead to more regulatory activity in the future. To achieve consensus, the EDSTAC finally settled on
a definition that retains "adverse" but also cites the precautionary principle. 202 An endocrine disruptor, according to
the EDSTAC, is an:
exogenous chemical substance or mixture that alters the
structure or functlon(s) of the endocrine system and causes
adverse effects at the level of the organism, its progeny,
199. !d.
200. See Peter Fairley, Low Dose Effects Challenge Risk Assessment Framework.
CHEMICAL WEEK, July 30, 1997, at 10.
201. See EDSfAC REPORT, supra note 10, at ES-1.
202. The precautionary principle has been formulated in different ways, but in
general holds that policy makers should be cautious in the face of uncertain environmental risks. Two authors have described the principle as ensuring "that a
substance or actlvity posing a threat to the environment is prevented from adversely affecting the environment, even if there is not conclusive scientific proof
linking that particular substance or activity to environmental damage. • James
Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment. 14 B.C. INTL & COMP.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1991).
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populations, or subpopulations of organisms, based on scientific principles, data, weight-of-evidence, and the precautionary principle.

If the EPA does decide to regulate EDCs under current
statutory authority, the agency should recognize the precautionary principle and the limitations of current risk assessment techniques. It should err on the side of safety in
deciding whether a suspected EDC should be on the market
or in setting permissible exposure levels for EDCs, especially because fetuses and infants appear to be particularly
vulnerable to endocrine disruption. Greenpeace has argued
that the chemical industry's testing of its own chemicals for
endocrine disrupting effects amounts to "cigarette science. "203 Although this charge is perhaps premature, that
risk assessment will be based largely on industry data also
suggests that the EPA should take a protective, cautious
approach to standard-setting for EDCs.
There are limits, of course, to how cautious the EPA can
be when regulating EDCs. Because the timing of exposure
appears to be as important as the level of exposure, the
EPA might theoretically set dosage limits on EDCs so that
humans would be "safe" at a specified time in hormonal cycles or development when the body is most vulnerable, even
if at other times the chemical would not cause harm to humans. Such stringent limits, however, could be politically
unacceptable, as they could possibly mean severe restrictions on certain products and materials.
2. Bureaucratic and Judicial Obstacles
In addition to risk assessment problems, the other major
impediment to responding to EDC risks by proceeding under existing statutory authority is that regulations must
pass through bureaucratic procedures and court challenges. The labyrinthine process of moving from risk assessment to rule-making to surviving a court challenge and
enforcing a regulation will delay implementation of protective measures and could deter agencies from proposing scientifically sound regulations ex ante. These delays in proposing, revising, justifying, and implementing rules are one
203. Fairley et al., supra note 101.
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of the primacy flaws in our current toxics regulatory regime.
The regulatory process is likely to be particularly vexing in
the context of EDCs because there is still much scientific
uncertainty and the risks are just beginning to be understood.
Before an agency finalizes any future EDC regulation, the
regulation is likely to be subjected to some form of costbenefit analysis. Statutes such as FIFRA or TSCA require
such analysis, as does President Clinton's Executive Order
12,886. 204 This order requires a full Regulatory Impact Assessment, including cost-benefit analysis, for any agency
rule that has an annual affect on the economy of $100 million or more or "adversely affect[s] in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities. "205
Cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool. Agencies should
ask the basic question of whether the harm from endocrine
disruption, taking all uncertainties into account, appears to
outweigh the costs of restricting a given chemical. The
problem, however, is that the human health benefits of restricting an EDC may be particularly hard to quantify. The
costs of industry compliance with regulations are much
easier to determine and may be weighed too heavily in the
equation. Further, the burden of performing the costbenefit analysis can itself delay or deter sound regulation.
As Richard Williamson has argued, "given the immense
data requirements involved, if the burden of performing the
analysis is placed on the government, the rule-making process will slow to a glacial pace and few substances will be
regulated. "206
Court challenges to agency rules probably present an
even larger hurdle to the effective regulation of EDCs. AI204. 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993)
205. Id.
206. Will1amson et al., supra note 86, at 648. Williamson suggests that the
burden of performing cost-benefit analyses might be shifted to industry. where
once the government has shown that a substance is toxic. industry would have to
show that the benefits of the substance outweigh its· costs. But Williamson acknowledges that under such a system. "industry will be forced to endure a staggering burden of cost and delay, • id., and he concludes that "allocation of the burden (of performing the cost-benefit analysis) will nearly always be outcomedeterminative. • Id. at n.211.
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though an agency might have the statutory authortty to
regulate EDCs, 207 the substance of agency regulations may
still be challenged in court. Courts would apply one of two
possible standards of review to agency regulation of EDCs:
either the "arbitrary and caprtcious" standard applicable to
informal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure
Act,208 or the "substantial evidence" standard that is mandated by some toxics statutes such as FIFRA and TSCA. 209
The line between the level of deference granted to agency
decision-making under the two standards is difficult to
draw. Even under the less exacting arbitrary and capricious standard, courts carefully scrutinize regulations and
demand that an agency justify its rule, show that it considered alternatives to the rule (including suggestions from
public comments), explain why alternatives were rejected,
and compile a record of scientific evidence sufficient to
support the rule. 210
Under either standard of judicial review, a plaintiff such
as a chemical manufacturer would have a strong chance of
defeating agency regulation of EDCs, at least in the near
term, because the scientific understanding of endocrine disruption is still in its infancy, because of the problems with
rtsk assessment discussed above, and because of inherent
limitations of the toxic statutes.
To be sure, some courts defer to an agency's scientific
judgments on highly technical matters. In Baltimore Gas &
207. As discussed above, toxics statutes are written broadly to encompass diverse types of harms. Thus, an agency argument that an existing toxics statute
provides authority to regulate a suspected EDC would probably be considered
-permissible" under the deferential test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), for judicial review of agency interpretations oflaw.
208. 5 u.s.c. § 706(2)(a) (1998).
209. See 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (FIFRA substantial evidence standard) and 15
U.S.C. § 2618(c)(B)(i) (TSCA substantial evidence standard). EPA tolerance decisions under the FDCA are reviewed by judges under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, except if the EPA Administrator has allowed a public evidentiary hearing
on a tolerance revision, in which case the decision will be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(h)(2).
210. Searching judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious standard is
called -hard look" review because courts require agencies to take a -hard look" at
possible regulatory responses to the problem that is the subject of the regulation.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr.'s Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983) (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescission of passive
restraint requirements in automobiles struck down under -hard look" review).
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Electric Company v. NRDC, 211 the Supreme Court stated that

courts should be at their "most deferential" when reviewing
agency detenninations that are at the "frontiers of science."212 Yet even assuming that courts would defer to the
EPA's scientific detenninations regarding EDCs, the agency
would nevertheless be saddled with cumbersome statutes,
such as TSCA, that make it nearly impossible to restrict
hazardous substances even where .the scientific evidence is
compelling. In the 1989 case of Corrosion Proof Fittings v.
EPA, 213 for example, the Fifth Circuit struck down most
parts of an EPA ban on asbestos, despite the fact that the
EPA had spent ten years developing the rule and had compiled a 45,000 page record to support the ban under
TSCA. 214 The Fifth Circuit held that the EPA had not chosen the "least burdensome" course of action, which TSCA
requires, 215 and that there were irregularities in the EPA's
cost-benefit analysis. 216 The decision was viewed as the
"death knell" for EPA attempts to ban toxic chemicals under
TSCA, given the time and labor that EPA committed to
banning a substance that was widely known to be hazardous. 217 The health risks of asbestos were one of the concems that had prompted Congress to pass TSCA in the first
place. 218
In general, regulatory agencies have had an abysmal record of incorporating new. substances into existing tox:ics
regulatory programs. Cumbersome statutes, notice and
comment procedures, and court challenges to agency rules
211. 462 u.s. 87 (1983).
212. Id. at 103. The D.C. Circuit has also been generally deferential in reviewing EPA's scientiftc determinations. See Inti. Fabricare Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 972 F.2d
384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The rationale for deference is particularly strong when
the EPA is evaluating scientiftc data within its tech..''lical expertise."); Envt'l. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (*In an area characterized by scientiftc and technologiCal uncertainty . . . this court must proceed
with caution. avoiding all temptation to direct the agency in a choice between rational alternatives.").
213. 947 F.2d 1201 (5.. Cir. 1991).
214. SeePERCIVALETAL., supra note 174, at 568.
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
216. 947 F.2d at 1215-1220.
217. See DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVElLE, TOXIC DECEPllON: HOW 1HE CHEMICAL
INDUS1RY MANIPuLATES SCIENCE, BENDS 1HE LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTif 138
(1996).
218. See td.
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have all contributed to this poor record. The EPA, for example, has deleted three pollutants from its list of toxic
water pollutants since 1976, and has not been able to add
any pollutants to the list. 219 The EPA promulgated standards for only seven hazardous air toxics under the Clean
Air Act between the 1970 passage of the Act and the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. 220 As Howard Latin of Rutgers
University put it, "[u]nrealistic judicial requirements for
comprehensive agency assessments of all potentially relevant factors and for a high degree of scientific precision
have substantially emasculated environmental control programs in the past decade. "221 This overall record of agency
impotence does not augur well for the difficult process of
justifying potential restrictions on EDCs.
Assuming courts were ultimately to approve EDC regulations, there is little doubt that the overall process of developing, justifying, and implementing any potential regulation
of EDCs would entail enormous cost and delay. For each
chemical it tries to regulate, the EPA might be faced with
years of litigation. As the columnist Jessica Matthews
noted, "[t]he economic stakes involved are so huge and the
epidemiology to prove cause-and-effect so difficult that the
regulatory quandaries we could soon be mired in will make
earlier struggles - over nitrites, saccharin, formaldehyde,
Times Beach, Love Canal, cholesterol, alar and even tobacco - look like kids' stuff. "222 Chemical, pesticide, and
plastics manufacturers would surely view regulation of
EDCs as a major threat and would probably invest heavily
in legal services to defeat any proposed rule.
In sum, there is a crucial difference between the statutory
authority available to regulate EDCs, which appears to be
sufficient, and the practical abUity to promulgate regulations restricting EDCs, which appears to be limited. Although there appear to be numerous problems with regu219. See Dembach, supra note 144, at 53.
220. See Branford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using an ·Exceptions
Process· to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 srAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 263, 268 (1994).
221. Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation. and Toxic Risk Assessment. 5
YAIEJ. ON REG. 89, 133 (1988).
222. Jessica Matthews, Overlooking the ·rops· Problem. WASH. Posr, March 11.
1996, at A19.
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lating EDCs, the regulatory route should be pursued. The
prospects for finalizing and implementing regulations will
improve as scientific understanding of EDCs improves, and
creative approaches to regulation, possibly involving voluntary testing consent orders or new legislation, could be
utilized to address EDC risks even if the science is not
completely conclusive. Regulatory approaches to EDCs
would be more feasible if reviewing courts were sensitive to
the difficult risk assessment problems surrounding EDCs
and followed the Supreme Court's admonition to defer to
agency findings at the frontiers of scientific research.
V. POTENTIAL LITIGATION OVER ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING
CHEMICALS

A

Obstacles to SuccessfUl Utigation over EDCs

Private suits have been an important component of environmental protection over the past three decades. Most
federal environmental statutes have "citizen-suit" provisions
under which any citizen may either directly sue polluting
entities to force statutory compliance or sue the EPA to enforce the statute. 223 Common law claims to address toxic
risks are more unusual, but a number of analysts have
suggested that tort law can act as a "gap-filler" to protect
public health and deter polluters where government regulation is incomplete, ineffective, or non-existent. 224 In theory,
private litigation over EDCs could supplement potential
regulatory efforts and deter manufacturers from producing
products with harmful chemicals.
Most common law environmental claims rest on nuisance
law or theories of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
223. See Shay S. Scott, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits & Other Private
Theories of Recovery, 8 J. ENvn.. L. & LIT. 369, 372-380 (1994) (overview of statutory citizen suit provisions). This article does not address statutory-based citizen
suits because endocrine disruption has not yet been incorporated into any type of
toxics regulatory regime. See infra Part V.
224. Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Environmental Risk. 14 PACE ENvn.. L.
REv. 531, 531 (1997) (describing gap-filling role of tort law); See also Gwyn Goodson Timms, Note, Statutorily Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Environmental Nuisance
Suits: Jump Starting the Publlc Watchdog, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1733, 1739 (1992)
(same).
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activities, 225 but neither of these doctrines is particularly
applicable to EDCs. Instead, potential EDC litigation would
probably be brought under product liability doctrine, where
the claim would likely be that a chemical (or a product
containing a chemical) is a defectively designed product
that has caused bodily harm through endocrine disruption.226 Failure-to-warn actions could also be possible.
Although there are some similarities between EDCs and
other toxic agents that have been the subject of litigation,
such as asbestos or DES, litigation would probably be an
ineffective legal response to the health risks of EDCs. Scientific uncertainty and the unusual characteristics of EDCs
are likely to foreclose litigation as a means to force manufacturers to intemalize their costs and compensate injured
parties.
Under traditional tort doctrine, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached this duty, 227 and that the breach was the
cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.
Proving cause-in-fact is the single largest barrier to successful litigation over EDCs. · Indeed, scientific knowledge
about endocrine disruption is unlikely to reach a point in
the next decade where it could support legal arguments
connecting a harm such as breast cancer, testicular cancer,
or reproductive disorders to a given EDC.
This is so despite the fact that the tort system does not
require 100% proof of causation, or even statistically significant proof (which most scientists set at 95o/o or 99%
confidence). Rather, courts have established lower (though
widely varying) standards for satisfying the burden of
provilig causation. 228 Some courts require the plaintiff to
225. See Shapo, supra note 224, at 533-542; Scott, supra note 223, at 381-387.
226. A number of product liability suits have already been brought against suspected EDCs, but for health concerns other than endocrlne disruption. See, e.g.,
Conde v. Velsicol Chern. Corp. 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1993) (chlordane as defective
product); Baker v. Monsanto Co., 962 F.Supp 1143 (S.D.Ind. 1997) (failure-towarn action against former PCB manufacturer).
227. Although product liability law is the most likely paradigm for EDC litigation, the issue of whether an EDC could be found to be a defective product is not
discussed in this article. The causation hurdle is so formidable that suits would
probably founder on that ground alone.
228. See generally, Falcon v. Mem'l. Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 46-48 (Mich.1990)
(discussing several causation standards in use in various jurisdictions).
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demonstrate that the defendant's action or product "more
likely than not" caused the harm. 229 This greater-than-fiftypercent standard conforms with the general "preponderance
of the evidence" standard of proof in civil trials. Other
courts require that the plaintiff show only that the defendant's action or product was a "substantial factor" in causing the harm, without quantifying "substantial. "230 Finally,
some courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is a
"reasonable medical probability" that the defendant caused
the harm, again without quantifying that phrase. 231
Regardless of which causation standard is in effect in a
given jurisdiction, however, an EDC would be unlikely to be
judged the cause of an injuxy. Although scientists have a
general understanding of the natural hormonal processes
regulating reproduction and development, too much is yet
unknown about how environmental chemicals disrupt the
endocrine system and modulate cell activity. Though several studies have associated EDCs with cancer and reproductive disorders in animals and humans, scientists still
cannot explain the physical and chemical mechanisms
through which EDCs cause harm. In short, there is too
much scientific uncertainty to support causation arguments, and this is likely to be the case for the near future.
Of course, epidemiological evidence and associational
studies ~g exposure to harm are not irrelevant to the
causation issue, and in many toxic tort cases such studies
are the major evidence offered by the plaintiff. In MerreU
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 232 a Bendectin233 case,
the Texas Supreme Court struggled to develop a causation
rule that would not completely block plaintiffs in such
situations from pursuing their claims. This case contains
229. See. e.g., Parson v. Marathon Oil Co., 960 P.2d 615, 617 (Alaska 1998);
Hambrick v. Makuch, 491 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
230. See. e.g., Rutherl'ord v. Owens-Illinois. Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
231. See, e.g., Marks-Brown v. Rogg. 28 S.W.2d 304 fl'ex. 1996); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc .• 561 A2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
232. 953 S.W.2d 706 fl'ex. 1997).
233. Bendectln is a morning sickness drug that has been linked to birth defects
such as malformed limbs. The central issue in most Bendectln litigation is the
scientific reliability of expert testimony offered by the plaintiff to establish causation. See t.d. at 708. The U.S. Supreme Court case that developed the standards
for admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm.• Inc .• 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), was a Bendectln case.
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one of the most recent extensive discussions by a state supreme court on causation problems in toxic tort cases and
thus provides some indication of how a court might handle
causation problems in potential EDC litigation.
The Havner court acknowledged "that a disease or condition either is or is not caused by exposure to a suspected
agent, "234 and that "epidemiological studies cannot establish
that a given individual contracted a disease or condition
due to exposure to a particular drug or agent. "235 The court
also recognized, however, that the law should balance the
cause-in-fact requirement with "the need to compensate
those who have been injured by the wrongful actions of another . . . ."236 The court concluded that epidemiological
studies could be offered to prove cause-in-fact in a probabilistic manner. The studies must show, however, that
exposure to the substance at least doubles the risk of contracting the plaintiffs disease to meet Texas' "more likely
than not" causation standard. 237 Further, the court held
that a plaintiff must show that he or she is similar to the
subjects in the studies in terms of the substance involved
and the dose levels and that other plausible causes of the
injmy can be excluded with reasonable certainty. 238 These
requirements, according to the court, "strike a balance between the needs of our legal system and the limits of science."239
The holding in Havner is similar to the conclusions of
other courts that have examined difficult causation issues,
particularly in requiring a showing of doubling of risk. 240
'qlese cases suggest that plaintiffs might be permitted to
rely on epidemiological studies linking EDCs to health
problems to support causation, but courts would carefully
scrutinize the studies for reliability and ensure that the
studies are relevant to the particular circumstances of the
234. 953 S.W.2d. at 718.
235. Id.. at 715.
236. Id.. at 718.
237. Id.. at 717-18.
238. Id.. at 720.
239. Id.. at 718.
240. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir.
1995) (on remand), cert. denied, 166 S.Ct. 189 (1996); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Phann., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F.Supp 1387, 1403 (D.Or. 1996).
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litigation in terms of the exact substance at issue and the
level of exposure. Animal studies alone are probably not
su:mcient to support causation, leaving plaintiffs with a
limited chance of success, as few human epidemiological
studies have been conducted and as medical ethics would
bar conducting controlled human studies related to EDCs.
A potential defendant, such as a chemical manufacturer,
would have several strong approaches to attack a plaintiffs
causation arguments, including pointing to conflicting
studies on the health effects of EDCs or to the presence of
confounding factors that might be the cause of a plaintiffs
health problem. 241 These factors would include hormonal
agents, such as birth control pills or phytoestrogen in
foods, or non-horinonal factors, such as genetics, smoking,
or exposure to lead or other heavy metals. Confounding
factors woUld be especially difficult to sort out in EDC litigation because the known health problems associated with
EDCs are not "signature diseases" that would strongly implicate EDCs as opposed to other agents. In contrast, asbestos or DES are both associated with a signature disease
such as mesothelioma or clear-cell adenocarcinoma. As
two critics of the chemical industiy have noted regarding
chances of success in toxic tort suits, "the presence of fingerprints has become far more important than the severity
of the crime. "242
Even if a plaintiff could show that synthetic chemicals
were the cause-in-fact of a health problem, tort law also requires that- the plaintiff identify which particular chemical
caused the harm. 243 Again, this is a near impossibility because modern society is permeated by synthetic chemicals.
United States production of syntheti~ chemicals was over
435 billion pounds in 1992, or 1,600 pounds per capita, 244
and pesticide use in the United States was over 4.5 billion
pounds in 1995, 245 or about 18 pounds per capita.. As dis241. See Kavlock et al .• supra note 1. at 732 (listing confounding factors in endocrine disruption).
242. FAGIN& LAVElLE. supra note 217, at 157.
243. See Mary Cabrera, Legal Remedies for Victims of Pesticide Exposure, 1 KAN.
J. L. & PuB. POL'v 113, 114 (1991) (discussing difficulties of farmworkers in identifying the specific pesticides to which they have been exposed).
244. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 137.
245. Arnold L. Aspelin, U.S. EPA Office of Preventton. Pesticides, and Taxic Substances, Pesticide Industry Sales and Usage: 1994 and 1995 Market Esttmates. 3
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cussed above, over fifty types of chemicals are suspected of
having endocrine-disrupting properties, they have numerous exposure routes, and they act in extremely low doses.
Many of the suspected EDCs do not even have chemical
structures similar to the natural hormones they disrupt,
and the "estrogen receptor system may well be unique ih
terms of the structural diversity of its effective stimulants. "246 Chemicals such as DDT or PCBs, which have not
been manufactured in large quantities in over two decades,
may be important contrtbutors to EDC risks, yet they would
be very difficult to identify as causal agents because they
are dispersed throughout the environment and the foodchain.
In addition, intervening agents would complicate causation arguments in an EDC tort suit. EDCs may not act individually, but rather may act in combination with other
chemicals, including natural hormones, through synergism,
inhibition, or potentiation. 247 In sum, the legal hurdles to
linking a particular health problem to a particular EDC,
even under less-than-fifty-percent standards of causation,
appear to be insuperable, at least with the current state of
scientlflc knowledge.
Several other problems would hinder both the use of litigation as a response to EDCs and the development of
regulations restrtcting EDCs. Because society is permeated
by syrithetic chemicals and because we have all absorbed
them into body fat to some extent, there is no unexposed
"control" group to which scientists, attorneys, or regulators
can compare individuals to argue that differential health
effects have occurred. 248 As stated in Our Stolen Futw-e,
"[v]irtually anyone willing to put up the $2,000 for the tests
will find at least 250 chemical contaminants in his or her
body fat .... "249 The lack of an unexposed control group
(Aug. 1997) <WWW.epa.govI oppbead 1 /95pestsales/95pestsales. pdf>.
246. John A Katzenellenbogen. The Structural Pervasiveness of Estrogenic Activity. 103 ENvn.. HEAL111 PERSPEC'IlVES, Supplement 7. 99. 99 (1995).
247. See Kavlock et al .• supra note 1. at 730.
248. See id. at 722.
249. COLBORN ET AL.. supra note 3. at 106. As an example of the lack of an unexposed control group. OUR STOLEN FuTuRE describes villagers living above the
Arctic Circle on Broughton Island, Canada. who have some of the highest body-fat
PCB concentrations in the world. PCBs from industrialized North America and
Europe have bioaccumulated in the Arctic foodweb. Id. at 108.
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does not mean that all the scientific research on EDCs is
flawed, but only that comparisons in humans are necessarily between those suspected of receiving a higher-thanaverage dose and the general population, which has also
been exposed to some extent.
·
As discussed above, natural hormones and the chemicals
that disrupt them act in extremely low concentrations in
the bloodstream, often at the parts-per-billion or even
parts-per-trillion range. 250 These minute dose effects make
it difficult to develop causation arguments in litigation, as
well as regulatozy programs within agencies. In addition, if
many EDCs are found to have the inverted-U-shaped doseresponse curve of DES, 251 it might mean that the most
common categories of plaintiffs in mass toxics cases, such
as workers exposed to a high dose of a toxic agent in an occupational setting, might not be the ones suffering the most
severe effects from EDCs. 252
A final dose-related issue that will cause problems for
potential litigation and potential regulation of EDCs is that,
at least in the case of in utero exposure, the timing of the
dose appears to be more important than the amount of the
dose. 253 Fetal development depends on : precisely timed
doses of hormones. A dose of an estrogenic synthetic
chemical received by a male fetus during the seventh
month of gestation may have no effect, for example,
whereas the same dose received during the first trimester,
when sexual differentiation occurs, could have a large detrimental impact. 254 Because EDCs can be stored in a
mother's body fat, a fetus may be exposed to EDCs taken
into the mother's body months or years before her pregnancy.255 According to Toppari, "[i]t is therefore not the
amount ... to which a mother is exposed during pregnancy
that ls critical, but rather her lifetime exposure that will
determine the level of exposure of the fetus and the breast250. See note 13, supra.
251. See Part IV(C), supra.
252. But see Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 758 (MBecause of better documentation and higher exposure, [occupational) studies are more likely to reveal adverse
effects of chemicals on humans than are the studies on the general population.").
253. See COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 62.
254. See id. at 46.
255. See Toppart et al., supra note 2, at 756.
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fed infant. "256 Without the ability to pinpoint the timing of
exposure, proof that a particular exogenous agent caused
harm to the fetus would be nearly impossible to obtain.
With diseases that have long latency periods, such as certain cancers, it would be difficult to determine whether the
cancer stemmed from an adult exposure to an EDC, exposure to the mother while she was pregnant with the fetus,
or exposure to the mother before she was pregnant with the
fetus. 257
B. Parallels with DES Litigation
The obstacles to a successful suit over EDCs are formidable under traditional tort doctrine. Over the past two decades, however, courts have shown some willingness to relax
traditional tort rules in another context: DES litigation. Because DES, a synthetic estrogen, is an endocrine disrupting
chemical with intergenerational effects, it serves as the
most relevant precedent for potential litigation over EDCs.
Despite the similarities between DES and EDCs, however,
the relatively plaintiff-friendly principles enunciated in the
DES cases are insufficient to provide a solid legal foundation for EDC litigation. Extensive discussions of DES litigation have appeared elsewhere, 258 but a few examples of
the novel theories courts have devised in DES cases are
useful for explaining why the DES cases do not improve the
prospects for successful EDC litigation.
The courts' willingness to relax traditional tort requirements in DES cases, such as the requirement that a plaintiff identify the specific defendant that caused harm (the
identification requirement), was a response to the unique
circumstances of the drug and its effects. DES-daughters
exposed in utero filed suit against DES manufacturers for
256. !d.
257. Furthermore, these problems arlse only after the cancer could be linked to
an EDC as opposed to some other cause.
258. The academic literature on DES Is voluminous. See, e.g., Richard Goldberg, Causation and Drugs: The Legacy of DiethylstUbestrol, 25 ANGLO-AM L.REv.
286 (1996); Tracy Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation LiabUity: A Proximate Cause,
18 CARDozo L. REv. 1217 (1996); David M. Schultz, Market Share UabUity in DES
Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of Causation In Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 771
(1991); Thomas Currie, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Metlwdfor Apportioning Damages in DES Cases, 10 J. CoRP. L. 743 (1985); Glen 0 Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Rejlections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982).
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compensation for. adenocarcinoma or other disorders, but
most DES-daughters could not identify the manufacturer of
the specific pills their mothers took during pregnancy. 259
Approximately 300 companies manufactured DES, with
companies continuously entering and leaving the market
during the three decades in which DES was in widespread
use. 260
In Sind.ell v. Abbott Laboratories, 261 the California Supreme
Court resolved the identification problem by employing a
"market-share liability" doctrine for DES cases. Under this
doctrine, once a substantial share of all DES manufacturers were joined as defendants and the plaintiff made out a
successful product liability case, damages would be imposed based on the share of the DES market that each defendant possessed, unless a defendant could prove that it
did not manufacture the particular pills taken by the plaintiffs mother. 262 Market-share liability shifted the burden of
proof to defendants to show that they did not cause harm.
The Sind.eU court reasoned that under this system each
DES manufacturer's liability over time would approximate
its responsibility for injuries, 263 and the court also added
that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."264
The doctrine that in certain cases a plaintiff will not be
required to identify a particular harm-causing defendant
could indeed be helpful in potential EDC litigation. A
plaintiff alleging harm from an endocrine disrupting chemical is similarly unable to identify particular defendants because the types of EDCs and the mechanisms of exposure
and injury are so varied. Significantly, the Sind.ell court
prefaced its outline of the market-share theory with a
statement advocating judicial activism in response to new
types of risks:
259. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1989),
cert denied, 493 u.s. 944 (1989).
260. Seeid.
261. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
262. See id. at 936-937. Whether the relevant market should be the national
market, the California market, or some regional market was not decided in the
case. This issue spawned years of litigation, and California finally settled on use
of national market share. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1076.
263. 607 P.2d. at 935.
264. Id.. at 936.
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In our contemporary complex society, advances in science
and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such
products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing
needs. 265

This statement is the strongest in DES case law that
plaintiffs might cite to advocate a relaxation of causation or
identification requirements in EDC litigation, and it suggests that courts will not be completely inflexible in adapting tort law to meet new circumstances.
Some courts, such as the New York Court ofAppeals in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 266 followed the SindeU market
share theory. Others rejected it and have continued to demand that plaintiffs identify the manufacturer of the particular DES pills the plaintiffs mother ingested. 267 Often
these courts are hesitant to make major changes in tort
law, such as market-share liability, because they believe
such changes should be implemented by legislatures, not
courts. 268 Some courts have implemented other types of
burden-shifting mechanisms, such as alternative liabj)ity,
in DES cases. 269 Signtllcantly, federal courts hearing DES
cases have been reluctant to devise novel theories of tort liability because federal courts defer to state judges on the
evolution of state tort law. 270 Therefore, potential EDC
plaintiffs are likely to find state courts to be a more favorable forum.
Although many courts in DES cases have relaxed traditional tort requirements in response to suits by sympathetic
plaintiffs who could not identify the defendant that caused
265. Id.
266. 539 N.E.2d 1069. (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
267. See, e.g.• Morton v. Abbott Lab .• 538 F.Supp. 593 (M.D.Fla. 1982); Payton
v. Abbott Lab.• 512 F.Supp. 1031 (D.Mass. 1981).
268. SeeMulcahyv. Eli Lilly & Co, 386 N.W.2d 67, 75-76 (Iowa 1986).
269. Under alternative liability, DES manufacturers who could not exculpate
themselves were subject to joint and several liability.. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
289 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
270. See Thomas J. Currie, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Method for
ApportiDntng Damages in the DES Cases, 10 J. CoRP. L. 743, 747 (1985).

336

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 24:289

their harm, the importance of the DES cases as precedent
for future lawsuits involving EDCs should not be overstated. Most importantly, it should be noted that the traditional tort law requirement that was relaxed in Sindell and
other DES cases was the requirement of showing which
specific manufacturer caused the harm. The requirement of
proving that DES caused the harm, as opposed to some
other factor, was not relaxed. 271 This latter requirement was
a surmountable hurdle in the DES litigation, despite long
latency periods, because most plaintiffs were able to prove
that their mothers ingested DES and because the plaintiffs
had signature diseases, such as adenocarcinoma, that were
strongly linked to in utero exposure to DES. DES was a pill,
and the exposure route was clear.
In contrast. dozens of compounds are suspected of being
EDCs. EDCs permeate the environment, and exposure can
occur through many· different pathways. Even if a plaintiff
could show that an EDC, as opposed to some other environmental agent or genetics, caused his or her health
problem (whether through in utero or direct exposure), the
plaintiff in the vast majority of cases will not know which
particular endocrine disrupting agent caused the harm. It
is only when a plaintiff gets past that hurdle that the DES
cases would be useful precedents. 272 At that point, it would
be appropriate for courts to follow the DES precedents and
relax the requirement that the plaintiff show which particular company manufactured the EDC that was shown to
have caused the injury. 273
One could imagine a system in which the identification
271. Further, the requirement of showing that DES was a defective product was
not relaxed. Plaintiffs still had to proceed under negligence or strict liability theories. In the latter case, plaintiffs had to show that the product was unreasonably
dangerous. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 51 (Wis. 1984).
272. Although proving causation would be harder for EDCs than for DES because of the large variety of EDCs and exposure pathways, identifying defendants
might be easier in EDC cases once a specific EDC could be shown to have caused
the injury. This is because there might be only a handful of manufacturers of a
given EDC, such as a pesticide, whereas there were approximately three hundred
manufacturers of DES. Indeed, eighty percent of the world pesticide industry is
controlled by only twenty companies. See JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S TOXIC
LEGACY- HOW SciENCE AND lAW FAIL TO PROTECT Us FROM PES11CIDES 3 (1996).
273. See Cabrera, supra note 243, at 118 ("Market share liability may be appropriate in cases of pesticide exposure when the victims can identify the specific
product responsible for their injuries.").
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requirement could be relaxed (and the burden of proof
shifted to defendants) at an even lower threshold of proof by
the plaintiff. For example, a rule might be devised so that
once a plaintiff has demonstrated that a synthetic EDC
caused his or her injury, all manufacturers of all EDCs
would be held liable on a market-share or other basis unless they could demonstrate that they did not cause the
harm. 274 This is probably the only legal rule that would give
plaintiffs in EDC suits any hope of success, but such a rule
would stretch tort doctrine to the point of absurdity and
would impose unfair burdens on defendants, as the entire
chemical industry could be roped into almost every potential EDC case.
It should be noted that courts in cases such as Hymowitz
and Sindell, recognizing the departure they were making
from traditional tort doctrine, attempted to limit the scope
of the novel theories they enunciated. The New York Court
of Appeals in Hymowitz, for example, stressed that "the
DES situation is a singular case, with manufacturers acting
in a parallel manner to produce an identical, generically
marketed product, which causes injury many years ·
later.... "275 The California Supreme Court in SindeU similarly stressed that a crucial factor in its decision was that
DES was a fungible product. 276 If all manufacturers of a
274. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Igrwrance in the Manufacture of
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773 (1997) (advocates shifting the burden of
proof on causation in taxies cases because chemical manufacturers have better
access to information about the risks of their products).
275. 539 N.E.2d at 1075.
276. 607 P.2d at 936. One commentator suggests that there is no reason to
limit the principles of Sindell to fungible products. See Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Rejlecttons on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982).
Robinson argues that liability could be imposed based on percentage contribution
to the injury in any case in which several factors contributed to a harm. "As long
as liability is proportionate to the risks created by a defendant, • he asserts, "there
Is no reason why the Sindell liability rule cannot be applied to cases involving
multiple and different risk-creating activities. • Id. at 750. He adds that "there Is
no reason even to require that all of the causal agents be identified, so long as It
can be proved what contribution a given defendant made to the risk. • Id. at 753.
Robinson's theory could potentially be useful in EDC litigation, as an EDC may be
one of many factors that contribute to a health or reproductive disorder. But
Robinson Is too optimistic about the ability of courts and juries to determine the
percentages by which various factors contribute to a harm, especially when all
defendants are not before the court. No court has adopted Robinson's theory
since it was first outlined in 1982.
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certain product can be brought trito a case, these courts
reasoned, there must be a showing that all defendants
contributed equally to the risk through manufacturing an
identical, fungible product. EDCs are far from fungible,
however. They exist in a huge variety of chemical forms
and concentrations in diverse products. Courts have generally declined to extend market-share liability to products
other than DES, such as asbestos (where the forms of asbestos and types of exposure varted), 277 and they would
probably be similarly hesitant to extend the market-share
doctrine to EDCs.
The differences between EDCs and DES highlight a fundamental principle of toxic tort litigation: litigation will be
most successful when the toxic substance is potent, associated with a signature disease, and emitted in a concentrated fashion from one or a small number of sources. It
will be least successful in cases such as EDCs where the
pollution is not highly toxic, is dispersed from a large number of sources, and does not cause a signature disease. 278
Plaintiffs' lawyers are likely to take the former type of case
because causal links will be easier to draw, whereas injured
individuals will have difficulty finding legal representation
for the latter type of case279 even if the overall health risks
from the dispersed pollution are larger. In short, "some environmental injury paradigms lend themselves to institutional responses such as tort litigation that are inappropriate or inapplicable for other paradigms. "280
C. Other Legal Parallels for EDC Utigation
There have been few non-DES cases in the United States
in which plaintiffs have claimed loss of fertility or harm to
reproductive organs. Most of these cases involve medical

277. See Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987)
(declines to apply market share theo:ry because asbestos products not fungible);
Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987) (same); Setliffv. E.I.Dupont
de Nemours & Co .• 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (declines to apply
market share theo:ry because products containing volatlle organic compounds are
not fungible).
278. See Troyen A Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1. 18 (1993).
279. See id. at 18-19.
280. ld. at 18.
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malpractice281 or defective intra-uterine devices (IUD's), 282
not exposure to environmental toxins.
One body of case law that might be relevant to potential
EDC litigation is the so-called "pre-conception torts." In
these suits, a plaintiff claims that the defendant caused
injury to the plaintiffs mother prior to the conception of the
plaintiff83 and that the injury resulted in a birth defect or
other health problem in the plaintiff. 284 For example, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed a child to proceed with a suit
where the child's mother had been negligently sensitized to
Rh positive blood at the age of thirteen, allegedly resulting
in the premature birth eight years later of the child, who
was brain damaged and needed frequent transfusions. 285 In
contrast, a New York court, concerned that liability be kept
within manageable bounds, barred a plaintiff from asserting
a claim for birth defects resulting from the negligent perforation of his mother's uterus during an earlier abortion. 286
The New York court distinguished pre-conception torts from
torts against existing fetuses, which are cognizable claims
in New York, stating that in existing fetus cases "there are
two identifiable beings in the zone of danger each of whom
is owed a duty independent of the other and each of whom
may be directly injured. "287
The pre-conception tort cases are relevant to any potential
EDC litigation because, as discussed above, mothers may
be exposed to EDCs years before conception and may store
the chemicals in body fat, then damaging a ·fetus in utero. 288
A question thus arises of when the tort occurred. Was it
when the mother was exposed to the EDC, or when the
EDCs seeped from her body into her child's? Which "be281. See, e.g., Battenfeld v. Gregory, 589 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Dtv.
1991) (plaintiffs allege that delay in removing ruptured appendix during pregnancy damaged uterus).
282. See, e.g., Mackereth v. G.D. Searle & Co., 674 N.E.2d 936 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996); King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992).
283. These are thus distinguished from the DES cases, where the claim is that
the plaintiff was harmed in utero.
284. See Batt, supra note 61, at 1235-1240, for a discussion of preconception
torts.
285. Renslowv. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
286. Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981).
287. Id. at 787.
288. See text accompanying note 255, supra.
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ings" are in the zone of danger, and at what times?
Apart from the DES cases, the case that is most factually
analogous to potential EDC litigation and that most closely
demonstrates the challenges that a potential EDC plaintiff
might confront is Sanderson v. Intl. Flavors & Fragrances,
Inc. 289 In Sanderson, the plaintiff sued several fragrance
manufacturers, claiming that their products caused sinus
inflammation, toxic encelopathy (brain damage). dysosmia
(deranged sense of smell), and "multiple chemical sensitivity."290 The plaintiff claimed th.at she was .exposed to fragrance products on over 16,000 occasions between April
1994 and October 1995, but for 70 percent of those occasions she was unable to identify the fragrance products to
which she was exposed. 291 Her claim was somewhat outlandish, and was treated as such by the court, but her
problem of identifying harmful agents after long-term exposure to a profusion of chemicals is similar to that which a
potential plaintiff would face in bringing a suit over EDCs.
The court granted the defendant's motion for summruy
judgment because although a "jury could probably find that
defendants' products, as a whole, were a substantial factor
in causing her injuries, plaintiff has no evidence whatever
from which a jury could find that any particular defendant's
products were."292 As discussed above, this is a likely
holding in potential EDC litigation as well, where EDCs in
general might be shown to have caused a harm, but not a
particular kind or brand of EDC. The court also rejected
the plaintiffs suggestion that she could meet her causation
burden by showing merely that her injuries were the type
caused by the fragrances, that she was exposed to the fragrances. and that there was some temporal connection between the exposure and harm. 293 "At best," the court explained, this "establishes only a 'mere possibility' that
defendants' fragrance products were the ones that caused
her injuries, and even less of a possibility that any one defendant's products caused them."294 The Sanderson court
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

950 F.Supp. 981 (C.D.Cal. 1996).
Id. at 986.
!d.
!d. at 985.
Id. at 988.
!d.
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concluded that the "[p]laintiffs only hope of meeting her
causation burden lies in shifting it to defendants," but then
proceeded to rejecf her arguments for imposing market
share or alternative liability. 295 The request for burdenshifting and market share liability, and the rejection of
those requests, are also likely scenarios in potential EDC
litigation.
Finally, the case is telling because the plaintiffs arguments rested on meager scientific evidence and involved a
new purported disease, "multiple chemical sensitivity," on
which little research had been conducted. Perhaps recognizing her slim chance of establishing causation, the plaintiff implored in a pre-trial motion: "Given the dearth of research on the neurotoxic effects of fragrances and fragrance
chemicals, what is a plaintiff to do?"296 The court responded
sardonically in its opinion: 'Wait. When a plaintiff can't
prove her case with reliable scientific evidence, she can't
prove her case."297
Fragrances and EDCs both fall into the same category of
diffuse exposures, non-signature diseases, and subtle effects. While the scientific evidence linking exposure to
harm is stronger for EDCs than for fragrances, Sanderson
suggests that the prospects for successful EDC litigation,
resting on similar facts of wide exposure to chemicals, inability to identify defendants, and controversial scientific
linkages, are limited. Sanderson also suggests that the
courts will not allow plaintiffs to proceed without substantial evidence of causation even where the courts recognize
that such evidence will be difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain.
D. Drawbacks of Utigation for Addressing EDC Risks
Despite the current practical difficulties with bringing an
EDC tort suit, a central normative question is whether the
legal system should encourage tort suits over EDCs as a
295. Id. at 989-992. The court stated that the plaintiff was not entitled to use
the alternative liability doctrine because she had not joined all potential tortfeasors. She was not entitled to use the market-share liability doctrine because the
products were not fungible and because she had failed to join a substantial share
of the market. Id.
296. Id. at 1003.
297. Id.
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means to compensate injured individuals, force EDC
manufacturers to internalize their costs, and fill potential
gaps in regulation of EDCs. Should courts be as hesitant
as they currently appear to be regarding relaxing causation
and identification requirements in non-DES cases? Should
they be more willing to shift the burden of proof to manufacturers of suspected toxic chemicals to show that their
products did not cause harm?
If the effects of EDCs are subtle and causation is hard to
prove, proponents of less stringent tort laws might argue,
the legal system should adapt to those scientific realities
rather than block the courthouse door to injured parties.
Indeed, some analysts have made this type of argument in
calling for a plaintiff-favorable response from the legal system to the dangers posed by EDCs. Mruy O'Brian, a toxics
and risk assessment specialist, asserts that "the legal
framework must reflect, rather than deny, scientific reality
regarding toxic chemicals"298 and that "litigation must creatively challenge the existing· tension between our legal
framework for toxics use and science. "299 Other scholars
have called for burden-shifting to defendants in toxic tort
cases. Wendy Wagner of Case Western Law School argues
that when lack of causation evidence results from the
manufacturer's failure to test a product, rather than from
inherent limits of scientific inquiry, the plaintiff should be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of causation. 300
Instituting major changes in tort law for EDC cases is
unwise, however, on several grounds. If legal rules were
relaxed so that a plaintiff did not have to eliminate confounding factors or identify the specific EDC that caused
harm, large damage awards might result. Consequently,
manufacturers ,may be overdeterred and beneficial chemicals might be withdrawn from·the market without a demonstration that they caused any harm. While burden-shift:fug
298. O'Brtan, supra note 6, at 332
299. Id.
300. Wagner, supra note 274, at 834-836. Wagner draws a useful distinction
between inherent scientific uncertainties, which she calls ~trans-science, • and scientitle uncertainties that could have been resolved by manufacturer testing. But
her argument would allow a plaintiff to sue almost any manufacturer of any toxic
chemical if the plaintiff could not identify the cause of her harm, with the burden
of proof shifting to those defendants whom the court determines have not adequately tested their product.
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may be appropriate if the plaintiff can identify the specific
chemical that caused a health problem (paralleling the DES
cases), plaintiffs should not be allowed to sue all or nearly
all chemical manufacturers, and shift the burden of proof to
them, on the mere assertion that EDCs p:1. general probably
caused a harm.
Studies linking EDCs to health and reproductive disorders in animals and humans are cause for concern, but it
does not necessarily follow that we should tum to the
courts to fashion a remedy. Litigation is not the answer to
every toxic risk. There is a fundamental unfairness inherent in imposing liability without a strong showing of causation, and arguments for deterrence, risk-spreading, or novel
theories of liability should come into play only once that
showing is made. As the California district court held in
Sanderson:
Courts are ill-equipped to conduct trials of entire industries,
and individual plaintiffs in a private action have no right to
put entire industries on trial. Private cases and controversies
must sweep more narrowly, catching within the litigation net
only those persons whom the plaintiff can link to the harm
that has befallen her. That application of these principles
may leave an injured person without a remedy in tort is no
objection, because the tort system is not designed to provide
,
fior every injury..~I
compensation

Compared to litigation, regulatory responses better address diffuse dangers from innumerable chemicals in the
environment (though regulations admittedly do not compensate harmed individuals). They can be implemented
based on scientific data that a chemical may be harmful to
the human population, whereas litigation depends on much
more substantial proof that a product actually caused harm
to a specific individual. 302 Furthermore, EDCs are similar to
301. 950 F.Supp. at 1003.
302. Regulatory measures could be based on an1mal tests of EDCs, whereas
toxic tort litigation often is not successful unW statistically-stgntflcant evidence of
a danger to the human population has been collected. In the asbestos context, for
example, the need for such evidence meant that litigation was not successful unW
decades after risks from asbestos were first identified, with dangerous exposures
occurring in the meantime. See Wendy E. Wagner, Note, nuns-sctence fn Torts.
96 YAIEL. J. 428,428 (1986).
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other substances, such as air or water pollutants, to which
the legal system has responded mainly through regulation
rather than litigation: the effects of EDCs are subtle, there
is a myriad of manufacturers and exposure pathways, and
the entire population is continually exposed to small
amounts of EDCs through diet and environmental agents.
Because EDCs cross state and even international boundaries, national regulation, rather than a patchwork of state
tort laws, is the more appropriate legal response. Although
regulatory standard-setting is by no means perfect, 303 regulatory measures could address EDC risks in a more targeted manner than is within the capabilities of the courts.
Litigation over EDCs, on the other hand, could result in
scattershot tort damages in which the most serious EDC
risks might not be addressed because they may be harder
to link to concrete injuries. Litigation would be an ex post
approach to the EDC problem because it involves claims for
compensation for harm that has already occurred. To be
sure, damage awards can also deter manufacturers in a
prospective fashion, but it might take decades of litigation,
proceeding chemical by chemical, before public health is
protected to any measurable extent.
While regulation appears to be the preferable route for responding to EDC risks, it would be most effective if Congress acted to reform key aspects of our toxics regulatory
system. Existing statutes are blunt instruments, and Congress should provide the EPA with better statutory tools if
the agency is to address what could be a significant new
type of toxic risk.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
It is beyond the scope of this article to outline comprehensively a new statutory/regulatory regime for EDCs. Designing a new regulatory architecture for EDCs is perhaps
premature given the recent nature of the science. To some
extent, creating a better system for responding to EDC risks
would entail overhauling the way all toxic chemicals are
regulated, as EDCs would probably be regulated under the
303. See infra Part IV for a discussion of problems in regulation of toxic chemicals.
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same statutes as other toxics. Other analysts have addressed the issue of reforming toxics regulation in general, 304 and the information that is coming to light about
EDCs provides one more argument for revisiting the fundamental assumptions and bases of U.S. toxics policy.
Ideas for new legal responses to EDCs are likely to progress
as the scientiflc research progresses, but some general suggestions may be proposed even at this stage.
A.

Prospects for Congressional Action

To avoid the limitations discussed previously related to
rule-making under existing statutes, congressional action
would be necessary. The prospects for further congressional involvement in the EDC issue are uncertain, however. On the one hand, Congress moved swiftly (within four
months of the publicity related to Our Stolen Future) to
mandate the endocrine disruptor screening programs in the
FQPA and the SDWA amendments of 1996. On the other
hand, these provisions were research-oriented and did not
provide the EPA with new regulatory authority. Some of the
congressional proponents of further endocrine disruptor research cited concerns about increasing rates of breast cancer in their states, 305 and especially if endocrine disruption
is viewed as a women's and children's health issue, it could
rise once again on the legislative agenda.
If Congress were to act, one positive approach would be to
use the data from the screening and testing efforts that will
occur over the next few years to legislate restrictions on
those EDCs deemed to be most hazardous. In the few cases
where there have been major additions to lists of regulated
toxic substances, they have occurred through congressional
In 1984
action, not agency rule-making procedures.
304. See, e.g.• Dernbach, supra note 144. See also Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Waters, the Certainty of Harm. Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENvn.. L. 321 (1988).
305. See 141 Cong.Rec. S17749-S17752 (daily ed. November 29, 1995) (dialogue between Senator Moynihan (D-NY) and Senator D'Amato (R-NY) on endocrine disruption, with mention of elevated breast cancer rates on Long Island).
These two Senators were joined by an influential House Democrat. Heruy Waxman
(D-CA). in supporting endocrine disruptor research. See 142 Cong. Rec. H10960
(daily ed. September 24, 1996) (Waxman explaining support for the Estrogenic
Substances Screening Program in FQPA and SDWA Amendments).
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amendments306 to the Resource Recovery and Conservation
Act (RCRA), 307 for example, Congress directed the EPA to
change its testing procedure for toxicity, leading to the addition of twenty-five toxins to the list of fourteen that were
already regulated under RCRA. 308 In the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, Congress directed the EPA to develop a
broader regulatory program for hazardous air pollutants
and listed 1n the statute the 189 pollutants to be regulated. 309 If Congress were to develop a statuto:ry list of the
most hazardous EDCs, with accompanying restrictions, it
would speed the process of protecting against EDC risks.
B.

Right-to-Know Provisions

The EDSTAC has re.commended a broad public outreach
strategy as the screening and testing program for EDCs
proceeds. 310 . This program includes public notification of
the testing process and test results, public input into
nominating chemicals for screening, and information releases tailored to specific groups, such as farm workers and
environmental justice organizations, who may be particularly affected by EPA decisions. 311 Public notification and
pro.cedural openness are essential to develop support
among various stakeholders for the screening and testing
program.
More broadly, Congress and the EPA should consider
listing endocrine disruptors under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) of the Emergency Planning and Community
312
~ght-to-Know_ Act (EPCRA).
The TRI, which is compiled
306. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 99 Stat.
3221 (1984).
307. 42 u.s.c. §§ 6901-6992k (1995) ..
308. See David Montgomery Moore, The Toxicity Characteristic Rule for Hazardous Waste Determination: Has EPA Satisfied Congress' Mandate?, 7 TUL. ENvrL.
L.J. 467, 468 (1994). The change to EPA's toxicity testing procedure is at 42
u.s.c. § 6921(g) (1994).
309. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(b)(l) (1994).
310. EDSTAC REPORr, supra note 10, at 7-19.
311. !d.
312. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1995). The TRI is outlined in the Act at §§
11022-11023. In a single rule-making, EPA was recently able to add 286 chemicals to the list of chemicals required to be reported under the TRI. See 40 C.F.R
pt. 372. The relative ease by which so many chemicals were added at one time
may be attrtbuted· to the fact that the TRI is a reporting statute and does not impose any restrictions on chemical releases. A challenge to this rule-making was
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from mandatory submissions of industry data, is the major
database of pollutants released by U.S. industry each year.
There is an emerging network of environmental, environmental justice, and public health groups focusing on endocrine disruption, 313 so intermediaries might be available to
interpret TRI information and to call media attention to
large releases of EDCs. Since the TRI covers only pointsource discharges, however, its usefulness for detailing
EDC risks might be limited.
California's Proposition 65 is a "right-to-know" law that
could be even more effective against EDCs. Passed in 1986,
it bars the discharge into drinking water of any chemical
known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity and requires
warnings before exposing individuals to such chemicals
through non-drinking water routes. 314 The California EPA
has compiled a list of chemicals subject to the law, many of
which are suspected EDCs, 315 and a combination of state
investigation of reproductive toxicity through endocrine disruption and private citizen suits to enforce the law could be
effective in addressing many EDC risks in California.
Proposition 65 involves burden-shifting. Under the law,
dischargers of chemicals must show that the chemical
poses "no significant risk" of human disease in order to
avoid the warning requirement. 316 In contrast to its usual
recalcitrance, industry has supported the California EPA's
promulgation of standards for "no significant risk" because
such standards provide bright-line rules for whether a
warning is required. 317 Furthermore, there is strong evirejected by a district court. See Nafl Oilseed Processors Ass'n. v. Browner, 924
F.Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1996).
313. See KEYsToNE CENTER, CONVENING REPORr REGARDING TilE FORMATION OF TilE
ENDOCRINE DISRUPI'OR SCREENING AND TEsnNG ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Oct. 1996)
<www.epa.govjopptintr/opptendo/keystone.htm>.
314. Cal. Health & Safety Code§§ 25249.5-25249.6. (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
315. OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTII HAzARD AsSESSMENT, CAUFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTION AGENCY, CHEMICALS KNOWN TO TilE STATE TO CAUSE
CANCER OR REPRODUCTIVE TOXICI1Y, (May 15, 1998) <WWW.oehha.org/prop65/cas
1598.htm> (listing suspected EDCs such as heptachlor, chlordane, DDT, DDE,
and dieldrin).
316. CAL. HEALTII & SAFElY CODE§ 25249.10(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
317. According to David Roe, co-author of the initiative, "California managed to
draw bright lines for more chemicals in the first twelve months of the Proposition
65 era than the federal government has managed to accomplish, under the supposedly omnibus Toxic Substances Control Act, in the previous twelve years.·
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dence that a major effect of Proposition 65 has been to
prompt companies to reformulate products containing hazardous chemicals in order to avoid the warnings about cancer or reproductive toxicity. 318 Because such product reformulations have occurred on a nation-wide scale, not just
for California, 319 this state "right to know" law has had a
positive substantive impact across the country. A national
toxics law modeled on Proposition 65 that involves burdenshifting could achieve similar results on a larger scale and
may be effective in responding to EDC risks.
C. Burden-Shifting under TSCA
A related step that could be taken at the federal level to
respond to EDC and other tQxic risks is amending TSCA to
shift the burden of proof to chemical manufacturers to
demonstrate the safety of chemicals. 32° Currently, the burden is on the EPA to identify synthetic chemicals that are
likely to present an "unreasonable risk," to require testing,
and, relying on data submitted by the manufacturer, to
make the decision on whether to restrict the chemical.
Each step in this process is cumbersome and subject to
delay, and in the meantime chemicals may be freely sold
and distributed. This has led to a situation in which few
chemicals are required to be tested and in which no toxicity
information is available for 78% of the 12,860 chemicals
that are used in quantities exceeding one million pounds
per year. 321
The placement of the burden of proof under TSCA is inconsistent with other statutes. Under FIFRA, for example,
the burden is on manufacturers to demonstrate the safety
David Roe, An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxtc Chemical Controls, 3 EcON.
DEV. Q. 179, 181 (1989).
318. See CUfford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under
California's Proposition 65, 23 EcOLOGYL.Q. 303,341-348 (1996).
319. See id. at 341.
320. Manufacturers are required to submit a Pre-Manufacture Notlftcatlon
(MPMN•J for new chemicals, but they are not required to develop toxicity data prior
to doing so. See EDSTAC REPORI', supra note 10, at 2-9. The EDSTAC states that
in reviewing a notlftcatlon for a new chemical, the EPA can use rtsk assessment
models to predict likely toxic effects of the chemical, but the EDSTAC also acknowledges that the EPA Moften drops review and gives approval for most chemicals.· Id.
321. See Dembach, supra note 144, at 28.
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of pesticides prior to receiving a registration from the
EPA. 322 Under the FDCA, drug manufacturers must obtain
Food and Drug Administration approval prior to marketing
new drugs. 323 Simllarly, before a manufacturer is permitted
to expose thousands or millions of people (many involuntarily) to chemicals whose connection to a health problem
might be difficult to prove in an ex post tort suit, the
manufacturer should be required by law to demonstrate the
safety to the chemical to the EPA.
To be sure, every manufacturer of a risk-producing product should not be required to obtain governmental approval
prior to sale. Chemicals can be distinguished, however,
from products such as power tools, sporting goods, or industrial equipment - products which carry some risks but
which normally do not require governmental approval. Individuals do not necessarily know that they have been exposed to chemicals, for example, and chemical manufacturers can generally escape liability for harm because of
difficult causation issues. 324 Tort suits alone provide an insufficient incentive for manufacturers to develop toxicity
information because it is precisely the lack of such information that may force dismissal of a suit on the grounds of
lack of causation evidence. 325 Requiring the development of
toxicity information before sale would go a long way toward
redressing the imprudence of current regulatory approaches to toxic chemicals.
322. Because the burden of producing safety information is on manufacturers
under FIFRA. the EPA has much more data on the hazards of a relatively small
number of pesticides than it has on the thousands of industrial chemicals produced in much larger quantities (which are regulated under TSCA). See EDSTAC
REPORT, supra note 10, at 7-16.
323. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1998). As part of the pre-market approval process, applicants must submit reports •to show whether or not such drug is safe for use
and whether such drug is effective in use." Id.. at § 355(b). This is exactly the type
of information that should be required of chemical manufacturers under TSCA.
324. As Troyen Brennan put it, in most mass product liability cases ·the plaintiffs worked with, or bought, the product. . . . Each plaintiff has encountered the
product in a manner that can be documented. The same documentation is not
possible in environmental torts unless the pollution leaves a residue." Brennan,
supra note 278, at 46.
325. See Wagner, supra note 274, at 774-776. While a ·duty-to-test" exists at
common law, most courts use it as a means to impose liability once a plaintiff has
shown that a product caused his or her harm. lf the plaintiff cannot make the
initial showing of causation, however, there is usually no •duty-to-test" liability.
Id.. at 803-805.
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Although they have not outlined their proposals in detail,
several endocrine disruption researchers have proposed
shifting the burden of proof about chemical risks to chemical manufacturers. The authors of Our Stolen Future argue
that "emerging evidence about hormonally active chemicals
should be used to identify those posing the greatest risk
and to force them off the market and out of our food and
water until studies can prove their impact to be trivial. "326
Mary O'Brian states flatly that "[u)se of chemicals should be
suspect. "327 She adds that "[s]ociety must end the failed
process of estlniating how much of each toxic chemical the
world can stand, and orient legislation and litigation
around the feasible process of determining how little toxic
chemical use is necessary. "326
Under a fair burden-shifting plan, Congress should require that toxicity information for all chemicals be submitted to the EPA by a specified date, with a prohibition. upon
manufacture or sale as the penalty for non-compliance.
Though it would be politically more difficult, Congress could
also prohibit manufacture or sale after a certain date unless EPA reviews the toxicity information and gives approval
to the chemical_ as riot posing an "unreasonable risk" to
human health. Congress would need to provide the EPA
with additional resources to sort through the submitted
data efficiently and to make scientifically sound determinations on thousands of chemicals. Of course, EPA determinations on whether a chemical could be manufactured or
sold based on the submitted data could still be challenged
in court, but at least manufacturers would have less incentive to delay.
As discussed in Part V of this article, courts should be
reluctant to shift the burden of proof onto defendants in
potential EDC lawsuits. Such burden-shifting would permit plaintiffs to sue dozens of chemical manufacturers and
force them to prove that they did not cause the plaintiffs
health or reproductive disorder. Burden-shifting in the
regulatory context, in contrast, would require only that
manufacturers demonstrate that a product will not cause
326. COLBORN ET AL., supra note 3, at 219.
327. O'Brian, supra note 6, at 354.
328. Id. at 358.
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significant harm to the human population. This is much
less onerous than repeatedly requiring companies to disprove their link to injuries of specific individuals.
On October 9, 1998, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and
the Clinton Administration announced a six-year program
to test the health and environmental effects of 2,800 chemicals produced in excess of 1 million pounds per year. 329 The
program, which implements many of the recommendations
of EDF's 1997 study, Toxic Ignorance, is expected to cost
the chemical industry $500-$700 million. 330 The program is
additional to the 15,000 chemicals that will be screened for
endocrine disrupting effects under the EDSTAC recommendations.331 That the chemical industry is undertaking voluntary testing for product safety (albeit under the threat of
EPA-ordered tests)332 is a very positive ~tep. It will be a
change from past industry practices of claiming that chemicals are safe without conducting safety research. The testing program has a number of safeguards to ensure that the
testing will be unbiased and that the results will be transparent. 333 Voluntary testing should not replace reforming
TSCA, however, anq eventually, testing should be expanded
to include lower production volume chemicals, so that the
burden of proof on chemical safety becomes fully shifted to
the cheinical industry.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The emerging research into EDCs has raised disturbing
warnings about new kinds of health risks from chemicals.
The data on falling sperm counts and other fertility problems, the DES experience, and reproductive disorders in
animals exposed to suspected EDCs all ~uggest that there
329. "Industry to Test 2,800 Major Chemicals for Health, Environmental Effects," EDF News Release, October 9, 1998 c:www.edf.org/pubs/newsreleases/
1998/oct/b%5Fcma.html> (hereinafter EDF News Release).
330. Id.
331. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Chemical Industry to Spend $1 BUlion to Assess
Product Safety, N.Y. 'nMEs, January 27, 1999, atA14.
332: See EDF News Release, supra note 329. Chemical manufacturers will have
13 months to volunteer their products for testing, after which EPA will mandate
testing through a TSCA test rule. See id.
·
333. Id. See also Deutsch, supra note 331.
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may be real risks to the human population through endocrine disruption. That these risks are not yet well-defined
does not mean that they should be ignored. The susceptibility of fetuses to endocrine disruption, the potential impact on human reproduction, and the fact that EDCs permeate the environment, all warrant caution in the face of
uncertain risks. Endocrine disruption must be taken seriously as a public health issue.
While there is considerable scientific controversy surrounding EDCs, it is clear that EDCs do not fit neatly into
traditional scientific and legal approaches to toxic chemicals. EDC characteristics such as low-dose effects, numerous exposure routes, and intergenerational impacts make
risk assessment difficult. Consequently, crafting any type
of legal response to EDCs will be extraordinarily problematic. Indeed, the current state of scientific knowledge regarding EDCs is probably too rudimentary to support legal
action.
Because there are so many obstacles to fashioning a response to EDCs, however, the legal and regulatory communities should closely follow the scientific research and begin
to consider the legal tools that may be applied as the scientific evidence grows stronger. More research into EDC risks
is necessary, but legal analysts should not be excluded
from the scientific and policy discourse because of the infancy of the research, nor because of an ill-advised desire to
reach scientific clarity before legal solutions are considered.
After all, the "endless pursuit of scientific knowledge can be
dangerous in a regulatory system in which toxic chemicals
are deemed innocent until proven guilty. 09334
At present, both litigation and regulation appear to be
blunt instruments to respond to EDC risks. Indeed, litigation over EDCs appears very unlikely to succeed, let alone
effectively deter EDC manufacturers. Regulation, with all
its flaws, is the preferable route to protect public health,
and regulatory capabilities would be greatly enhanced if
Congress acts to reform the major toxics statutes.
The application of law in contexts of scientific uncertainty
is frequently controversial, inevitably leading to claims of
under-regulation from the left and over-regulation from the
334. FAGIN & LAVEUE, supra note 217, at 229.
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rtght. When the scientific community begins to research a
new type of toxic rtsk, the legal community should avoid a
premature response unsupported by the data, but it should
not let scientlftc uncertainty prevent sensible steps to protect public health.

